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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary A ffairs by the Editor

T he Abortion Muddle
It's not depressing that the politicians are talking
about religion; it is depressing that they are talking
about it so badly. Not in recent memory has a major
issue been so buried in intellectual and moral confusion.
Elsewhere in these pages, Gail McGrew Eifrig sorts out
some of the larger questions involved; here we propose
to look only at the specific question of abortion, which is
by any reasonable measure the most significant of the
contested issues in our current wars of religion.
We might begin by noting that abortion is not, in the
narrow sense, a religious question at all. Roman Catholics oppose abortion, but so do a great many other people whose attitudes towards Catholicism range from
sympathetic non-affiliation to total antipathy. Abortion
is not a sectarian or denominational issue, and those
who define it in those terms are guilty of obfuscation.
Geraldine Ferraro contributed greatly to the confusion on this issue by attributing her "personal" opposition to abortion (as opposed to what can only reasonably be termed her public support of it) to a "gift of
faith" that she appears to ascribe uniquely to people of
her religious persuasion. But Catholics have for centuries argued such questions on the basis not of religious
revelation or deposit of faith but of natural law, a law of
moral discernment open to all men and women without
regard to Christian commitment or understanding.
When we argue about abortion we are not in the category of debate involved in, say, doctrines of the Immaculate Conception; we are concerned rather with issues
open to all people on the basis of natural reason. Does
anyone seriously believe that the questions of when life
begins or whether it is subject to protection by the state
are matters of obscurantist theological dispute?
These are public issues, subject to public debate. Prochoice advocates insist that abortion is a private matter
and that it is impermissible for those who oppose abortion to "impose" their beliefs on those who do not. After
all, they argue, we would not require pro-lifers to have
abortions; why should they insist that we not have them?
Governor Mario Cuomo of New York recently carried
the argument a step further by distinguishing between
categories of sin and crime and attempting to argue that
anti-abortionists, like prohibitionists of an earlier age,
were confusing the former with the latter.
But the whole point of the pro-life argument is that
abortion cannot be considered a private matter precisely
October, 1984

because it involves the taking of other, innocent life.
The right of private decision ends where it interferes
with the public rights of others, and it is at that same
point where sin edges over into crime. The only coherent moral argument in favor of free choice on abortion
involves the assumption that fetal life is not human life,
and it is noteworthy how seldom the pro-choice argument focuses on that issue.
We offer no serious moral consideration to "free
choice" on such matters as slavery or racial discrimination. Why should we do so with respect to abortion?
Surely arguments concerning privacy or the right of
women to control their own bodies (not to mention such
moral absurdities as the assumption that lives not eagerly anticipated by the parents are not worth the living)
cannot be considered on the same moral plane as the
right to life.
The most plausible pro-choice argument has to do
with civic virtue rather than moral virtue. Whatever the
ultimate rights or wrongs of abortion, pro-choice advocates suggest, the American people have not yet reached
a moral consensus on the question. (That the public is
ambivalent on the matter seems clear: opinion polls
regularly reveal a majority of Americans opposed to a
ban on all abortions, but those same polls find a majority
opposed to abortion-on-demand.) Given that lack of
consensus, it is argued, pro-life people sho"uld, in the
interests of civility, tolerance, and respect for pluralism,
refrain from insisting that their opposition to abortion
be written into law. They should try to persuade others
to their point of view rather than coerce them.
That argument has its attractions, but also its obvious
limits. Civility is a high democratic virtue, but prochoice people ought to understand why pro-lifers insist
that it cannot take precedence over what they see as the
protection of innocent life. In any case, the pro-life
Hatch amendment would not ban abortions; it would
simply leave the matter open for state and federal
governments to handle through the legislative process.
If, as pro-choice people insist, they have the public with
them on the issue, they will be able to block restrictions
on abortion. If they can't, perhaps there is more of a consensus against abortion-on-demand than they suppose.
One thing is certain: the American people can only
hope to reach an informed consensus on abortion if the
arguments concerning it on either side are presented to
them with intellectual and moral clarity.

••
••
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Robert Benne

NEOCONSERVATISM
AND NEOLIBERALISM
Is There a Real Difference?

Over several years of written and oral conversation,
Jim Nuechterlein and I have deliberated about an interesting question: is the distinction between neoconservatism and neoliberalism a distinction without a difference? As he once nicely put it: "As an intellectual exercise, the neoconservative/ neoliberal distinctions are
worth making and maintaining, but they are, in effect,
family quarrels. In reality you will get a lot more sympathetic hearing from people like me than from hardly
any of your old liberal friends." Now that was a nice
existential way of framing the issue, since I have tried
to define myself as a neoliberal and he finds himself
comfortable with the other label. I am interested in
finding out whether I have departed so far from American liberalism that my old friends will no longer hear
me out, and I will have to resort to conversations with
cranks like Nuechterlein.
The best way to find this out is to articulate what neoliberalism means to me. In so doing I will be in the company of others who consider themselves to be neoliberals, but my main purpose is a confessional one
rather than a detached, objective effort at precise description. If sufficient disagreement is elicited from
Mr. Nuechterlein, perhaps we have a real difference.
American liberalism, at least since Franklin Roosevelt, has focused on the inclusion of the newcomers, the
have-nots, and the excluded into American politics,

Robert Benne is Jordan- Trexler Professor of Religr:on and
Chairman of the Department of Religion and Philosophy at
Roanoke College, where he is also Director of the Center for
Church and Society. He is the author of The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A Moral Reassessment. His article,
"Capitalism and the Moral Order, " appeared in The Cresset
in October, 1983.
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and, through the political levers at their new-found
disposal, better entrance into the American economy
and society. That is why the Democrats continue to be
the party of recent immigrants, the working poor, the
poverty-stricken, blacks, and, more recently, women.
American liberalism's concern for justice-fair political
representation , fair equality of opportunity, and a basic
social and economic minimum-has a continuing moral
appeal for me. At their best, conservatism and neoconservatism have consolidated and streamlined liberalism's programs, though they have rarely initiated such
efforts at inclusion. At their worst, they have tried to
dismantle rather than reform the initiatives of the liberals, though they have rarely been successful in such
negative reactions. As a liberal , I want to continue to
be on the initiating side of things, since I believe there
are many challenges before us that demand just-making
policies.
If liberalism has such a moral appeal and has been
relatively successful, why is there a need to affix a "neo"
to it? Because, I believe, the old liberalism, represented
by the Ted Kennedy wing of the Democratic Party, had
and continues to have four liabilities that call for rethinking. The old liberalism ignores or denigrates the
role of the private economy; its policies tend toward a
statist centralization; it has a too-expansive notion of
government concern and competence; and it has invited
in its quest for inclusion groups whose outlook seriously
contradicts traditional American values concerning
patriotism, family , and religion. Such tendencies, if not
reversed, will sentence American liberalism to minority
status in the future.
It is interesting to note how forcefully this year's
Democratic National Convention addressed the first
and fourth of these liabilities. However, the address to
the first carried with it major governmental interventions into the private economy of a protectionist nature.
The second and third liabilities were actually reinThe Cresset

forced by the implication that government would wipe
every tear away from those who for any reason suffer in
the United States.
Be that as it may, neoliberals want fresh , imaginative
policies that do not carry with them the liabilities of the
old liberalism. First, neoliberals want to emphasize the
importance of non-inflationary growth in the private
economy. They are firmly in favor of the vitality expressed by a dynamic, competitive market economy.
They know that the general level of well-being of society is much more the result of non-inflationary economic growth than of the influence of government programs. They are pro-business in so far as business plays
by the rules and operates in a workably competitive
context. And they certainly do not identify bigness with
badness, as so many left-wing Democrats in fact do. In
short, a neoliberal can believe in democratic capitalism
with a good conscience. In my own book, The Ethic of
Democratic Capitalism-A Moral Reassessment, I have
listed other contributions of a market economy to our
democratic society. I believe it to be a compelling case
that market economies are helpful partners to democracy, and vice-versa. So, neoliberals affirm the market
economy.
Second, neoliberals suggest that we must find ways to
pursue the liberal agenda of justice in ways that are
more efficient and decentralized than those liberals
have recently depended on. This means paying attention to many of the suggestions put forward by conservative and mainstream economists, who generally have
a keen eye for efficiency and decentralization. The old
liberal policies aimed at securing justice have in many
cases fallen short of what they were intended to achieve.
I, for one, do not believe that a more equal education
for urban children will be realized by sinking more
funds into the present urban school system or by taking
it further into the orbit of federal funding and control.
Why not, for example, modify the voucher system proposed by Milton Friedman so that it is biased toward
the poor? In selected urban areas we should give the
parent(s) of impoverished children education vouchers
worth 150 per cent of their education for use either at
public or private elementary schools. Catholic and Lutheran schools would quickly arrange education for the
poor in ways that public schools do not, thus providing
real competition for the public education monopoly.
At the same time the parochial schools would become
financially viable and would tap the idealism of many
young teachers who want to help the poor but who also
want to teach in small schools with a modicum of discipline and moral cohesion.
Many more examples of the combination of liberal
ends with conservative means could be explored in
areas such as medical care, energy, ecology, income
October, 1984

maintenance, and worker retrammg. (Incidentally,
Gary Hart's notion of an individual retraining account
to which both employer and employee would contribute over the years is a fine neoliberal response to the
possible prospect of redundant workers and industries.)
These approaches would generally entail a fuller use of
the private sector- both profit and non-profit- in pursuing justice in ways that are more efficient and decentralized.
While I grant that conservatives and neoconservatives
would heartily agree with my neoliberal first plank,
i.e., affirmation of the market economy, they would be
much less comfortable with the second. For neoconservatives are conservatives; they are more likely to opt
for the known status quo than for the unknown effects
of government activism. Therefore, they tend to be reactive rather than active, answering constructive proposals with so many qualifications and objections that
little initiating gets done .
This reluctance to initiate flows from a variety of
apprehensions, all of which I respect but with which I
do not fully agree. Conservatives tend to believe that
government has encroached on too many areas of life
already, and they resist further ventures. Some believe
liberalism does not allow for luck, fate, or the creative
role that risk-taking plays in any society. Others believe
that liberals are trying to change things that cannot be
changed. Still others believe that government always
botches what it undertakes, and winds up with results
opposite to what it intended. Whatever the partial validity of these hesitancies, it remains the case that American society has moved on and improved the lot of many
of its more vulnerable persons, and with little thanks
to conservatives.
It is very important to have persons of a conservative
temperament in government and society, but it is even
more important to have people who make constructive
proposals in response to serious problems. Conservatives and neoconservatives are in the former group; neoliberals are in the latter, pursuing the liberal agenda
in new ways.
The third liability of the older liberalism-its propensity toward an overly expansive notion of government concern and competence-is more difficult to
define and correct. I agree with neoconservatives that
there is a growing segment of the public sector-sometimes called the "new class"- that has a vested interest
in government intervention and expansion and therefore generates a "victim" industry in our society. The
old liberalism as well as the churches are often sitting
ducks for that industry. At bottom much of this hyperintervention derives from an implicit commitment to
equality of condition rather than equality of opportunity. Inequality of condition for these folks automat5
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ically implies injustice.
Neoliberals, on the contrary, believe in a fair game
with fair rules-fair equality of opportunity. Such a
game, neoliberals believe, will lead to more equality of
condition than we now have, but they see little grounds
for government to fix outcomes. Thus, neoliberals
eschew quotas and notions of "comparable worth ." Neoconservatives join neoliberals on those issues , but are
much less likely to support fair equality of opportunity,
i.e. , compensatory treatment to get disadvantaged persons closer to the same starting line as the non-disadvantaged in the race for genuinely open positions.
The fourth liability of the older left-liberalism of the
Kennedy-McGovern wing of the Democratic Party is
being vigorously addressed by the ascendant MondaleFerraro faction. It made every effort to present itself
at this year's Convention as the epitome of patriotism,
wholesome family life, and religious commitment. It
remains to be seen whether the pressure of militant gays,
feminists, unilateralists, and secularists will surface
again to dash this attempted affirmation of mainstream
values.
At any rate, neoliberals-and I really can't see any
sharp distinction from neoconservatives on this scoredo not want to see an American public ethic shaped by
the sole principle of free consent. Implicit in the left's
rush toward inclusion of "alternative life-styles" is a
moral relativism that is very chilling indeed. There
seem to exist no parameters except what persons freely
prefer. This leads to what Richard John Neuhaus calls
the "naked public square," a public ethos bereft of moral
and religious legitimation .
Regarding foreign policy, the neoliberalism I would
like to identify myself with has a firm , unabashed commitment to America's interest and cause in the world ,
and is willing to use American power, including military power, to pursue them . America has an interest in
maintaining a stable geopolitical balance which totalitarian regimes threaten to undo. But we also have a
cause- to encourage and support the democratic project wherever and whenever we can . There are of course
limits in our ability to further democratic reform , but
that cause gives us a positive, constructive intention in
the world.
Neoconservatives tend to build around a negative
principle: anti-communism. This leads them to see too
many conflicts as simply illustrations of East-West conflict. It also makes them too friendly toward right-wing
authoritarian regimes and therefore too reluctant to
support vigorous democratic reform in those countries.
The conservative attitude toward the Marcos government in the Philippines is a case in point.
On the other hand, too many left-liberals are infected
by the myth of American guilt. Whatever is wrong in
6

the world , in their view , is the result of the unjust exercise of American power. This leads them to a left-wing
isolationism that is extremely dangerous for America
and its friends. Unfortunately, Gary Hart falls under
this stricture. His campaign utterances seemed to assure
the world that we had no interests in it worth defending.
Neoliberals believe accommodation can be reached
with the USSR, Cuba, China, etc. , but must be done
within the context of American firmness and strength.
Marxist-Leninists yield only when they have something
to gain from yielding; they do not pay for services already rendered. Neoliberals are convinced of the continuity involved in deterrence strategies, rather than
the discontinuity associated with neoconservative views,
which posit a terribly dang·erous window of vulnerability which we have frantically to patch up. Neoliberals
also avoid the discontinuity involved among those liberals who tend toward unilateralist impulses fueled by
the notion of American guilt, i.e. , that we have instigated the arms race .
I rest my case. I believe the distinction between the
two "neo's" is enough to make a difference, even if it is.
only a way of distinguishing between groups who want
to inhabit a creative center in American politics. American liberalism is worth reforming; it is also possible to
reform. Those beliefs make me a neoliberal rather than
a neoconservative.
••

••

Ride Your Fine Nag
Ride my rhyme horse with the meter-free hair
Ride ride 0
Together we'll poet
Hey high 0
Wide to the fume of the word-laving tides
we'll ride
to side with the scream
dream with the horse
while we carve up the 'i's
demolish the nays
Poem my pride ride your fine nag
though it catch in the hair of the hag of the spire
Starshine in a mire is well worth the ride.

Fanny Ventadour
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James Nuechterlein

THE NARCISSISM
OF SMALL DIFFERENCES
A Response to Robert Benne

Bob Benne thinks he has a quarrel with me, and maybe, if he pushes our marginal disagreements to their
limits, he can find one. He will have to work hard at it
though. I would not claim that neoconservatism and
neoliberalism cannot be distinguished from one another, but I think that he will find me a more congenial
political companion (however cranky) than any of his
erstwhile friends in the liberal community. The political
world of neoliberalism (at least as described by Mr.
Benne) holds far more in common with neoconservatism
(at least as I understand it) than with contemporary
liberalism. If Mr. Benne doubts this, he might reflect
for a moment on who liked his book on democratic
capitalism and who did not.
Mr. Benne seems afflicted by the same obsession that
possessed many of the original neoconservatives in the
late Sixties and early Seventies : the insistence, above
all else, that proprietary rights to the liberal label not
be relinquished. One can understand that obsession. In
the intellectual world, identification with liberalism is
the natural and preferred condition. To be thought a
conservative of any kind-even worse, to announce oneself as a conservative-ranks in attractiveness with a
reputation for attachment to the occult. It is considered
rather peculiar; it needs explanation. No one in the
academic community ever has to explain why he is a
liberal. And better neo than nothing.
But custom has a way of imposing itself, even among
intellectuals. After years of insisting that they ought
properly to be called neoliberals, political intellectuals
like Norman Podhoretz and Midge Deeter came reluctantly to accept that the nomenclature controversy
had been lost, that the liberal world was closed to them,

James Nuechterlein is Editor ofThe Cresset and Associate
Professor of Political Science at Valparaiso University.
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and that they were stuck, like it or not, with the neoconservative label.
Bob Benne, I suspect, will meet a similar fate. His
views seem to me considerably at odds with those of a
Gary Hart or a Paul Tsongas, with that group of Atari
Democrats who have added a high-tech gloss to their
traditional liberalism and who have appropriated the
neoliberal category for themselves. Mr. Benne may continue to resist inclusion among the neoconservatives.
Fair enough. But given the awkwardness with which
he fits any of the varieties of liberalism, he will then
wind up having to invent a separate political designation for himself. Life could get lonely.

The political world of neoliberalism
holds far more in common with
neoconservatism than it does
with contemporary liberalism.
When we move from the abstractions of labels to the
specifics of policy, we see that Mr. Benne's differences
with neoconservatism are not so great as he supposes.
In fact, as he spells out his disagreements with current
liberalism, he makes a case and lays out a program with
which most of the neoconservatives I know would have
little quarrel. In his four-point critique of liberal domestic policy weaknesses (and his own counterproposals), Mr. Benne admits to a number of agreements
with neoconservatives; and in order to establish a measure of distance from them, he has to elide some important conservative/neoconservative distinctions.
Mr. Benne concedes that neoconservatives agree with
his sympathy for traditional values related to patriotism, family life , and religious commitment. He notes
that this year's Democratic convention tried earnestly! would say desperately-to reclaim those attachments
7

for liberalism, but it seems clear that they are the more
natural property of the Right than of the Left. The adversary culture has firm roots in the liberal community,
and the Mondale-Ferraro attempt to disguise that reality can be at best only modestly persuasive. Compare,
for example, the platforms of the two parties on such
issues as abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and defense of the national interest as the foundation of foreign policy.
Mr. Benne also concedes that neoconservatives have
fewer reservations than do liberals concerning support
of a competitive market economy. It is true that Mr.
Mondale inserted a good word for the private sector
in his speech accepting the nomination, but that reference was striking precisely for its impression of novelty
at a Democratic convention . Liberals do not reject capitalism, but they very seldom have anything positive
to say about it either. Their defense of a market economy characteristically has about it a grudging and highly qualified character. Neoconservatives, by contrast,
defend democratic capitalism as essential to the American proposition.
On the related question of liberalism's "propensity
toward an overly expansive notion of government concern and competence," Mr. Benne attributes to neoconservatives a more timid position than they in fact
hold. Neoliberals, he says, object to modern liberalism's endless generation of new classes of "victims" and
its increasing tendency to emphasize equality of condition over equality of opportunity. Yet, he argues , neoliberals want to ensure fair equality of opportunity, and
this sympathy toward compensatory treatment for the
disadvantaged distinguishes them from neoconservatives.
It is not clear just what Mr. Benne has in mind here.
He explicitly excludes quotas and theories of comparable worth from his notion of legitimate compensatory
treatment, and one wonders what acceptable methods
of compensation he might favor that neoconservatives
supposedly would oppose. Since most neoconservatives
explicitly reject the doctrine of laissez-faire and a number of them have indicated their support for non-quota
aid to the disadvantaged, it seems that on this issue Mr.
Benne is indeed conjuring a distinction without a difference.
Mr. Benne makes his most plausible case for a neoliberal/neoconservative distinction when he lays claim •
for neoliberalism to the traditional liberal concern for
"inclusion of the newcomers, the have-nots, and the
excluded" into the mainstream of American life. If, in
his view, the liberal reform agenda has in recent years
too often depended on statist and inefficient schemes,
it has at least maintained its passion for justice, and it
is that passion he finds lacking in neoconservatism and
8

wants to keep alive. Neoconservatives, he says, have
so many reservations about affirmative government
that they seldom come up with constructive proposals
for improving the lot of those least able to make it on
their own in American society. They lack imagination
and initiative, and their preoccupation with the fallibilities of government leaves them captive to the complacencies of the status quo.
This is not a trivial argument, but neither is it fully
persuasive. It is true that neoconservatism, which originated in a reaction against the perceived excesses of
the Left, retains a lively sense of the dangers of utopianism and the limits of politics. It shares with traditional
conservatism a certain philosophical skepticism toward
ambitious schemes of social reconstruction. Conservatism finds its essence in a sense of humility before God
and history, and that sense of humility, cultivated too
well, can lapse into a failure of social imagination.
But it is important to note here the distinctions between conservatives and neoconservatives. Neoconservatives, like neoliberals of Mr. Benne's persuasion,
are anti-statist without being anti-government. They
do not share the secret desire of much of American
conservatism that government might find a way of going
out of business. Nor have they been as unimaginative
as Mr. Benne suggests in proposing solutions to social
problems. The pages of The Public Interest, a neoconservative journal, have been filled with novel social designs and investigations, and Irving Kristol, the coeditor of The Public Interest and the most prominent
figure in the neoconservative movement, has written
often of a "conservative welfare state" that would employ precisely the blend of "liberal ends with conservative means" that Mr. Benne urges on us. Neoconservatism , in other words, may not be as self-consciously
preoccupied with the condition of the marginal members of society as neoliberalism, but it is not indifferent
to their fate and it may in practice be able to address
their difficulties more usefully than many of those liberals (I would not here include Mr. Benne) who wear
their concern for "the poor and oppressed" so ostentatiously on their sleeves.
If we turn to Mr. Benne's views on foreign policy, we
see a pattern similar to that on domestic issues. Here
again he stakes out a position to the right of contemporary liberalism but distinguishable, he thinks, from
neoconservatism. But, as before, he seems to me to be
straining in his efforts to distance himself from the neoconservative community.
Neoconservatives share his strong commitment to
defense of American interests in the world, and, like
him, they recognize that such defense must include the
willingness, where necessary, to employ military power.
They also share his rejection of the myth of American
The Cresset

guilt and the tendency to left-wing isolationism that
flows from it and that now is a dominant force in the
Democratic party. Note how even Walter Mondale,
who likes to imagine himself a foreign policy realist,
has consistently been forced by liberal pressures within
his own party to retreat from any position where the
threat of force might seriously be contemplated. Consider Grenada: no liberal administration would have
acted as decisively-and with such positive and welcomed results for the Grenadian people-as the Reagan
Administration did. Finally, neoconservatives also
agree with Mr. Benne that accommodations with communist regimes can only be reached within a context of
American firmness and strength.
Where, then, reside neoliberal/neoconservative distinctions? Mr. Benne thinks that neoconservatives are
too narrowly anti-communist, too friendly toward rightwing authoritarian regimes, and too much concerned
with presumed vulnerabilities in the American defense
posture. With some neoconservatives some of the time,
perhaps so, but not with most of them most of the time.
And even where neoliberal/neoconservative differences do exist, we are again speaking of disagreements
at the margin, not at the heart of things.
Most neoconservatives I know see communism as the
greatest single threat to American interests and values
in the world, but they do not see it as the only one. Similarly, they share Mr. Benne's preference for democratic
over authoritarian regimes, but they know that on some
occasions alliance with an authoritarian government
friendly to U.S. interests constitutes- at least in the
short run-the least bad alternative. If they hesitate to
put too much pressure on the Marcos government in
the Philippines, it is not because they favor repression
but because they remember the Shah in Iran. As for the
matter of deterrence, I share Mr. Benne's skepticism
about any great "window of vulnerability," and I do not
think that doing so excludes me from membership in
reasonably good standing in the neoconservative community.
In· terms of substance, of course, it does not matter if
Mr. Benne prefers to call himself a neoliberal (or a neovegetarian, for that matter) rather than a neoconservative. Names do not necessarily signify. But it does matter that he understand that, whatever designation he
prefers, the views he holds are closer to those held by
people commonly known as neoconservatives than to
those held by people commonly known as liberals.
What Mr. Benne's neoliberalism shares with neoconservatism- and what distinguishes both of them
from contemporary liberalism-is a highly positive
valuation of American values and institutions. Neoconservatives and neoliberals alike believe in the system of democratic capitalism and in the traditional
October, 1984

moral values that undergird it; in foreign affairs they
see no fundamental contradiction between support of
American national interests and pursuit of a humane
international order. Liberals, by contrast, have adopted
an adversarial- or at best skeptical- stance toward
their nation's pattern of political economy at home and
its pursuit of the national interest abroad.
I would propose, in conclusion, that my friend Bob
Benne perform a mental experiment. Let him imagine
himself presenting his political and economic views to
two different audiences, one composed of a representative range of American liberals, the other of a similar
group of American conservatives. From which audience
does he suspect-does he surely in his heart of hearts
know- he would receive the more sympathetic response?
And then let him decide if it is really so important that
he be known as a neoliberal rather than a neoconservative.

••••

To Saint Teresa
What wild traffic of life
-a quarter million geese
lifting off the marshes flying northpulled up through your veins
while you held firm to earth,
dear tender, dear ravished Teresa?
To what reed
at the tearing
at the boring,
of firey beaks

did you cling
of your veins,
through every pore,
and burning wings?

How did you pray when their chatter
bumped your heart,
and fluttered in your brain?
And how, when the sharp pain of their release
sang through the hollows of your spine?
Who pressed damp cloths against your eyes,
who caught your sighs, revived you,
when it was over and the land
lay dark and sodden once again?
And where is now your dwelling p lace
sweet wise, sweet bride, Teresa?

Ruth El Saffar
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Jeff Smith

DARK TRUTHS
Prophecy, Ethics, and the Nuclear Peril

The cinema of nuclear holocaust, as any fan can tell
you, has already in its short history established distinct
subgenres. On the one hand are films like On The Beach
and the recent Testament and The Day After, in which
the protagonists are common people and the story one
of human endurance, or lack thereof. A nuclear strategist might call these "post-attack scenarios"; as a group
they constitute the Cinema of Victims. (The Day After
gave equal time to pre- and post-attack phases, but as
the title suggests, the first part was mainly a setup.) On
the other hand are "pre-attack" stories, which focus on
events that could lead to war and feature the doings of
generals and Presidents; this group could be called the
Cinema of Perpetrators. In it belong the recent hit WarGames and the TV movie World War Ill, together with
the twenty-year-old classics Fail-Safe and Dr. Strangelove:
Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
Pre-attack stories naturally tend to be more concerned
with the causes, both superficial and underlying, of
nuclear apocalypse. This being so, a Poetics of world
destruction could further group the films by the theories they imply about these causes. On the one hand are
Fail-Safe and World War Ill, the "agonized-President"
stories, in which the focus is on diplomatic efforts aimed
at averting a war that accident (Fail-Safe) or misunderstanding (World War Ill) threatens to start. On the other
hand are John Badham's WarGames and Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove, the "machine-out-of-control" (or
frantic-President) stories, in which the focus is on efforts
to reign in the system itself. This sub-sub-genre implies
that nuclear catastrophe would not occur out of "mere"
misunderstanding or accident. (To speak of "accidental"

Jeff Smith is a graduate of Valparaiso University and a Ph.D.
student in the English Department at the University of Chicago. Later this fall he will begin research in film and cultural history at the British Film Institute on a Fulbright
Fellowship. His previous contributions to The Cresset znclude "Taking Movies Seriously" (October, 1983).
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catastrophe with 50,000 deliberately built warheads in
the world is a bit crazy anyway, like saying, "I was pouring kerosene all over my house and accidentally burned
it down. ")
Given this premise, it is interesting that WarGames
and Strangelove were perhaps the most commercially
successful theatrical films of the whole holocaust genre.
By positing an inherent problem in the war machine
itself, these films have the most to say on the questions
that should and do preoccupy us politically: how we
got into the nuclear predicament, precisely what sort
of predicament it is , and how, therefore, we might get
out of it. Comparing them, while also looking over
some recent, more philosophical attempts to grasp the
problem, throws light on the historic debates that we
are forced by the Bomb to encounter anew.
I

The "serious" adventure tale central to WarGames
obviously differs in tone from Strangelove's ironic satire,
but this by itself doesn't make clear the films' differing
perspectives. If anything, the more sober viewpoint belongs to the black-comic Strangelove. Like all pre-attack
stories, both films center on event at the high levels of
command. In WarGames David , a teenage computer
whiz, "hacks" into the North American Air Defense
(NORAD) computer and starts a nuclear-war-game
countdown that the computer mistakes for the real thing.
In Strangelove a deranged Air Force officer, Jack D.
Ripper, launches a nuclear squadron toward Russia in
response to what he imagines are Communist plots to
impurify his "precious bodily fluids" by fluoridating
water. The President and his staff chiefs then discover
they don't know the "recall code" and that the bombers
will trigger a Russian "doomsday machine."
WarGames, however, frequently returns us to people
and places in the real world-parents, suburbs, David's
bedroom at home-as though underscoring that the
problem is in the high command, not here. Strangelove
never shows such an "everyday" world beyond the stifThe Cresset

ling interiors of War Rooms and B-52s. The lack of a
"normal" world free of the high command's hysteria
forces our attention to what's wrong with the people
themselves. If WarGames embeds NORAD in the real
world and keeps the two distinct, Strangelove embeds
the whole world in the angular confines of the Strategic
Air Command.
Strangelove similarly blurs WarGames ' sharp distinctions between reality and games, and machines and
people. Problems arise in WarGames only when games
are confused with reality, as they are by the computer
and its inhuman way of "thinking." In Strangelove the
ODly r"eality we see revolves around the "game" of nuclear preparedness, and the machine that threatens man
is this whole system, including bomber, crew, "threat
boards," posturing generals, and incompetent statesmen. Again we are forced inside the people to probe
their symbiosis with their tools, a symbiosis epitomized
by the figure of Dr. Strangelove, who handles his wheelchair more capably than his own fist.
By keeping the distinctions sharp, WarGames externalizes the threat. It implies that something essential to
man lies outside the ominous system. This human quality is represented by David and his competence, which
is what saves mankind from its manufactured Goliaths.
Since the competent are also the good (one becomes
capable by being serious, humble, and chaste), skill will
always serve, never oppose, other values. For all its
late-model hardware, WarGames is really the old American outlaw myth . David wins the right to ignore the
mundane rules, security systems, and politics of his
machine-ridden world because he knows that world the
way movie detectives know city streets and movie cowboys know shortcuts to the pass. We welcome his raids
on it because we trust that his purposes are ours too.
David's mastery allows him to "re-educate" the NORAD
computer, proving that machines can be humanized if
they're turned over to adolescents, computer "nerds,"
or other genuine human beings. David saves civilization from itself by staking out for human values the
wild and woolly microchip frontier.
WarGames says, Machines can be like people: We're
saved. Strangelove says, People are too much like machines: We're doomed. In Strangelove's world, competence, as Thoreau put it, is as likely to serve the devil,
without intending it, as God. Competence built and
serves the machines, which take on a life of their own.
Bomber commander "King" Kong's good ol' Yankee
know-how just hastens disaster by getting the bombbay doors unstuck. No one in this world has an overall
grasp of things like David's, and in any case there is no
room for outlaws: Major Kong's Cowboys-and-Indians
approach to "nucl'ar combat" just looks ridiculous. An
open, frontier-like realm of human mastery and freeOctober, 1984

dom is not to be found on blinking blue screens any
more than on the ruddy horizon.
Finally, if WarGames unselfconsciously appropriates
American myths, Strangelove very deliberately uses old
movie conventions to attack such myths. The B-52's
flight toward Russia builds suspense the same way old
World War II flicks used to, suggesting that what the
nuclear army does is an extension of what armies have
always done-and that's just the problem. Eventually
these old-movie conventions are turned back against
us, inasmuch as they have us hoping that the plane will
get through. They make even our real real world complicit in the destruction of the world on screen.
II
One might not expect this from Hollywood, but these
two popular films differ as they do by virtue of reenacting an ancient controversy of Western culture.
Their differing views of the Bomb derive from sharply
differing views of human nature, views which- borrowing from Geoffrey Aggeler's essays on Anthony Burgess, whose novels have inspired other work of Stanley
Kubrick's-we might label the "Pelagian" and the "Augustinian." These terms are a tribute to the debate's
classic expression, the fifth-century argument between
Pelagius, the British monk, and St. Augustine, the great
Church Father, over the question of original sin. As
Aggeler points out, that argument, secularized and
applied to social and political questions, has continued
throughout our history, with the Pelagian belief in
human perfectibility on earth echoed by "humanists"
like Rousseau and Thomas Paine, and the Augustinian
insistence on man's weakness and fallen state reasserted
by Hobbes, Edmund Burke, and other so-called "conservatives" (though where contemporary issues are
involved terms like "liberal" and "conservative" are
confusing).
WarGames' belief in a human spirit apart from the
war machine is clearly Pelagian. It reminds one of the
faith in an "unqualified rule of Mind" that historian
Hiram Haydn attributes to the Renaissance humanists.
By comparison, Strangelove takes the Augustinian position that there is no way to separate the human spirit
from its works, and that humanity's predicament today
is historically continuous with its past-the humanistic
belief in progress is an illusion. All this depends on
seeing the rule of Mind, and Mind itself, as radically
qualified. Mind somehow negates itself, and given this
view, Strangelove's ending becomes a perfect negation of
WarGames ': a beautiful dance of mushroom clouds as
mankind erases itself.
If two films of the same sub-genre turn out to express
virtually opposite points of view, so the recent writings
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of two philosophers of disarmament, though they eventually come around to similar conclusions, also differ
surprisingly in terms of this fundamental debate. On
the one hand lies The Fate of the Earth by Jonathan
Schell (Knopf and Avon, 1982) and Schell's newly published sequel, The Abolition (Knopf, 1984). On the other
lies Freeman Dyson's Weapons and Hope (Harper and
Row, 1984). These works illuminate each other, and
especially by contrasting the broad perspectives offered
by Weapons and Hope and The Fate of the Earth (which
both originated as New Yorker magazine serials), we
derive new ways of looking at the nuclear problem.
The purpose of The Fate of the Earth is the same as
that which Aggeler attributes to Pelagius: a desire to
awaken mankind from a "sinful indolence" that is held
to be the problem of the age. In Schell's view this indolence results from the Bomb, which thus is presented
as a radically new thing in history, a "revolution" in
human affairs comparable to man's Fall from Grace.
By inventing the Bomb, we have "eaten more deeply of
the fruit of the tree of knowledge," changed the fundamental human condition, and enlarged our power to
the point at which it now threatens "both history and
biology." And this threat is permanent, since "a basic
scientific finding," like nuclear chain reactions , "has
the character of destiny for the world."
Schell worries not just that a sizable nuclear exchange
could extinguish mankind, but also that by mortally
threatening the human future we undercut the source
of meaning and value for our lives in the present. That
source, he says, is what Hannah Arendt called the
"common world," or essentially culture. To save the
future , the common world, and the meaning of existence, we must "reinvent politics" and find a global solution to the peril.
Notions of a basically self-defeating quality overarching human experience sound Augustinian. But in
fact, from an Augustinian view, Schell's assumptions
merit a searching critique, beginning with his belief
that the problem is new and, indeed, arises from the
rule of Mind. Schell's notion of a "second fall" discounts the significance of the first Fall, which, whatever
one thinks of Genesis as history, is a key event for any
Augustinian analysis. To an Augustinian one bite of
the apple was enough, and ever since man has needed
saving from his own will.
Short such a view, Schell leaves open such questions
as why scientific knowledge is destiny, and why it
chooses to endanger the knower. Though justifiable, it
is essentially humanistic to worry that while human
beings once lived in some sort of harmony with natural
law, they have suddenly become "actors in the geological time span." The Augustinian would be inclined to
theorize about why man's "judgments, moods, and de12

cisions" loom up so "terrifying" before nature.
Related questions apply to Schell's idea of the common world as "the great edifice by which individual
death is overcome," man is allowed to "imagine a future
beyond his own life," and man's works are saved from
"the natural ruin of time." (Any place humanity isn'tthe deep past, the threatened future-Schell calls "darkness.") From an Augustinian viewpoint, this makes the
common world an outgrowth of the Fall and a device
for maintaining the human will to power transcending
nature. Thus it actually implicates the common world
in our threatened second fall-which therefore ceases
to be a "second" fall.

The purpose of The Fate of the Earth
is the same as that attributed to
Pelagius: a desire to awaken
mankind from its "sinful indolence."
In The Fate of the Earth, biological existence, culture,
and scientific mastery in the abstract (recall WarGames)
stand apart from the "judgments, moods, and decisions"
that give us the Bomb. Hence the book calls for conserving what is fundamentally human (the common
world) over against any "particular standard, goal, or
ideology" that we might be tempted to treat as the "sum"
of all existence. But it could be argued that mankind
has scarcely done anything but treat partial, temporal
ideologies as cosmic sums of existence, and that biological life and culture have routinely gone by the
boards in the process (as Schell himself hints in remarks
on genocide) .
National sovereignty, the system Schell correctly
sees as the root of the nuclear terror, is in this view
simply the latest in a long line of such ideologies. In
this book Schell cannot engage the sovereignty problem
because he believes that government arose in the first
place for human betterment, rather than as an instrument of exploitation, class dominance, Oedipal trauma,
or what have you. Hence it remains a puzzle that sovereign nations today threaten mutual annihilation to
stay sovereign . The Bomb itself Schell looks to as cause
rather than consequence of the "ludicrous" failure of
politics "even to aim at the basic goals that have traditionally justified its existence."
Ultimately Schell does not deal . with the fact that
ideologies are themselves products of the common world
and part of the human effort to "mean" that he values
so highly. To live "meaningfully," rather than just live,
may be essentially human, but paradoxically it's just
the creature that "means" that's willing to see its whole
race die. Meanings are the symbolic links by which one's
The Cresset

personal existence is tied to a perceived (in fact, common) world . Therefore, meanings are what let the creature believe that without me, the world means nothing,
and therefore is nothing, and might as well cease to be.
Holocaust is hardly, as the cliche has it, "unthinkable":
just the opposite. The great value of Schell's humanism
is its effort to persuade a modern public that should
know better that, practically speaking, there are no
meanings left once we're all dead. (The fact that, impractically speaking, many of us might still attach meaning to the destruction itself is a problem addressed
further below.)

III
So while the Pelagian view sees the Bomb as a gigantic,
perhaps tragic, error, a by-product of misplaced reliance
on certain meanings, it is also possible to see it as central to the whole historic mission of mankind to mean.
Instead of representing, as Schell puts it, the mere failure of "consciousness and will," nuclear weapons in this
view stand as the positive, desired achievement of a consciousness and will that are radically flawed. Schell
denies that we "love the Bomb," a Ia Strangelove. He is
aware of claims that "innate" human violence and a
"territorial imperative" require for all time a system
of nuclear-armed states. But he rejects such ideas of
"some dark and ineluctable truth in the bottom of our
souls," and instead calls on us to "delve to the bottom
of the world" for a global political solution, like world
government.
"Territorial imperative" is a reference to the bestselling pop-anthropology of Robert Ardrey, another
author much admired, not coincidentally, by Stanley
Kubrick. Among other things , Ardrey's books attacked
the notion that the nuclear problem can be solved by
world government. But Ardrey is not a worthy opponent for Schell. His naive Augustinianism is more level
with that of the real-life Dr. Strangeloves, those diehard
strategist-advocates of deterrence and the nuclear stockpile. Kubrick's Augustinianism is more sophisticated,
even if it, too, offers little hope. But likewise more
sophisticated is the theory offered by Freeman Dyson
in Weapons and Hope, the very title of which promises
that in this book hope is not excluded.
Dyson's analysis looks very unlike Schell's effort to
"delve to the bottom" for unified truths about existence. Instead Dyson skims through history-which , he
assumes, still "proceeds at its old slow pace" - in order
to explore how "the cultural patterns of the past persist."
This involves looking at the different meanings attached
to the Bomb by different interest groups-warriors and
"victims"; diplomats, pacifists, "scholar-soldiers ,"
scientists, poets, and the Russians ; arms controllers, deOctober, 1984

fense advocates, and proponents of "technical follies."
These groups are historically conceived, and the various opposing ideologies they represent long predate
nuclear weapons. Dyson is more interested in how present policies grow out of longstanding ways of thinking
than he is in how ways of thinking have been remade
by those policies. Ideas, for Dyson, are prior to technology . (Hence technology is always political. Recall
that The Fate of the Earth asked us to transcend politics,
and that WarGames, in line with those old American
myths, posited an apolitical technics that could be
apolitically mastered.)
The theory that emerges from this analysis explains
our peril in terms of converging dynamics. For Dyson,
a physicist who has advised the British and American
governments on weaponry, there is a dynamic to warfare, a dynamic to policymaking, and dynamics to technology, arms control, international relations , and the
human soul. So far these dynamics have militated in
favor of nuclear weapons, but all could also militate
against them . For instance, in technology there is a
good dynamic whereby defensive weapons gradually
replace weapons of mass destruction. In international
relations there is a bad dynamic whereby the Russians ,
following their historical experience, unwittingly scare
us with their strategic doctrines of "first strike," and we,
following ours, scare them in turn with tactical doctrines of "first use." (In Strangelove the Russians build
their doomsday machine first out of fear of a "doomsday gap.") And nuclear weapons are themselves an
equivocal dynamic in history, having inhibited world
war at the cost of risking world destruction.
These ironies are reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove, which
also emphasized the equivocal nature of even positive
human urges. Besides technical skill, there are such
noble traits as propriety, memorably expressed in President Merkin Muffley's outburst, "Gentlemen! You
can't fight in here! This is the War Room ." But as this
irony suggests, in this world the bad tendencies overshadow the good. However individual relations are
governed, institutionally it's the savage or wrongheaded
impulses that rule. This is the essence of Strangelove's
satire. Characters can be well-intentioned, wellinformed, or effectual, but never all three at once; they
rely on machines that function well but only at the
wrong times; they follow orders when the orders are
mistaken, then take "initiative" when the right ones
come through.
Dyson's view isn't this bleak, but his historical tales
do reinforce the sense that in man's collective life, at
least, he tends to choose the worst of both worlds. Thus
J. Robert Oppenheimer advocates small tactical weapons for Europe in hopes of forestalling a crash "Superbomb" buildup; in the end we get the world-threatening
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Superbomb and unstable tactical deployments that make
its use more likely. Likewise George Kennan, a hero of
Dyson's, argues in 1944 for a stabilizing postwar balance of power; the U.S. pursues grander schemes of
world order (including international control of atomic
weapons) , and when these fai l we end up with both the
balance of power and a destabilizing arms race-a situation Dyson likens to Europe's in 1914. Today, we risk
getting both the MX missile and a makeshift basing system that belies the missile's original purpose and invites
a Soviet pre-emptive attack. It's Goofus and Gallant,
but with Gallant always just advising and Goofus making final decisions.

Are we condemned by the viciousness of
our natures always to arm ourselves
with the most vicious weapons?
Dyson denies that "we are condemned by the viciousness of our nature always to arm ourselves with the most
vicious weapons," but we can rightly wonder why, in
the case of Oppenheimer, Kennan, Einstein, Admiral
Rickover, Robert McNamara, and others, lucidity about
the peril has always seemed to correlate with a lack of
influence on policy, and vice-versa. It does seem that
while individuals may be wise, institutions and nations,
and individuals as members of same, have a gift for
turning wisdom to folly-probably all the while believing they have no other choice. (In the March 1984
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, historian Barton Bernstein shows that just such assumptions of powerlessness
underlay the Truman Administration's Superbomb decisions.)
Given the historical record, Dyson speaks explicitly
of "original sin" as a factor to be weighed in evaluating
possible solutions. Though he uses the term narrowly,
it highlights his Augustinian inclinations, which bring
his analysis closer than most to uncovering the problem's psychic roots. Next to the ignorance, paranoia,
and fatalism most authors recognize as factors, Dyson,
perhaps surprisingly, sets fun, adventure, and beauty.
Nuclear explosives, he has said elsewhere, "have a glitter more seductive than gold to those who play with
them." We must realize that there are military men
"happily looking forward to the days after the SlOP
[nuclear-war plan] is executed," just as Major Kong was
ecstatic as he war-whooped his way to Armageddon.
This, then, would be the really troubling "dark and
ineluctable truth" in our souls: not the will to violence
or some territorial imperative, but the fact that even
our better instincts move us to "love the Bomb."
This insight suggests a far different program than
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does naive Augustinianism, which recognizes only the
more overt "dark truths." Naive Augustinianism requires that we surrender to the eternal need for a huge
store of deterring armaments; it assumes that since dark
truths created the status quo, they also dictate its perpetuation. One reply to this is Schell's effort, which is
to shift the burden of proof off those who favor sharp
breaks with present policy and onto the naive Augustinians, whose ranks, if by default, currently include
almost everyone. Accomplishing the shift requires holding the peril before us and demanding that we face it
until we have it thoroughly abolished. We might call
this the reply of the prophet (that is, the religious-type
prophet), since what most commentators seem to mean
by calling The Fate of the Earth "prophetic" is its stringency in calling us to political perfection.
It is interesting that Dyson disagrees sharply with
Schell on two points, forgetfulness and the assumption
of survivability. Unlike Schell, Dyson sees it as a good
thing that we can forget about nuclear weapons and go
on about our daily lives. And unlike Schell, who thinks
the uncertainty of mankind's surviving a nuclear war
means assuming the apocalyptic worst, Dyson sees the
same fact as suggesting that we take rational steps to
limit a future war's damage (but not that we Strangelovianly speak of "only" twenty million deaths as "getting our hair mussed"). The difference in both cases is
the difference between prophecy and ethics. Dyson's
reply to the naive Augustinians is that of the ethicist.
His idea of hope, a virtue "to be practiced whether or
not we find it easy or even natural," is an attempt at
doing an ethics for a nuclear-armed world. Ethics takes
a narrower view of the nuclear danger because it sees
the world as fallen regardless of it. But conversely, it
asserts that having fallen into the "knowledge of good
and evil" requires, and permits, rigorous efforts to limit
evil and choose good.

IV
Prophecy and ethics together attack our hopelessness,
which rests on the arrogant notion that human power,
by a series of individual choices, has somehow built up
an edifice from which new choices cannot bring us back
down. This notion makes of the Bomb a Tower of Babel
whereby we assert that our works have come to extend
as high as heaven. Prophecy shows us the real summit
to be scaled and so begins the climb down from these
vain heights, but the confessions of guilt it inspires are
also reaffirmations of our ethical power to make new
choices. Ethics in this sense completes the prophet's
work. It is not surprising that Schell's new book, The
Abolition, follows this logic to the point of also searching
for an ethics ("a deliberate policy"), one whereby we
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still heed the prophet's call to perfection but also "balance" it within the total framework of ·daily life.
The Abolition reveals a crucial accretion of Augustinian insights in Schell's thinking. It is sympathetic to the
dilemmas of "political realism" that undercut his earlier calls for a reinvented world, and it acknowledges
the historical dynamics at work: The nuclear buildup
was "apparently fuelled by a tremendous internal momentum .... Deterrence theory, it seemed, was competent to start an arms race but not to stop one." Schell
recounts how this theory went from distasteful expedient to permanent, official "dogma" even while producing such absurdities as Euromissile deployments
that have heightened the fears they were originally
supposed to calm. Such "steady retrogression over the
last thirty-nine years" leaves us in this sinful but eloquently rendered state:
Through the balance of terror. we. all come to hold a dagger to the
hearts of those nearest and dearest to us as well as to threaten those
far away . ... Our acceptance of nuclear weapons is in that sense a
default of parenthood. of love. of friendship . of citizenship. in which
we all. like hijackers of airplanes . take one another hostage and
threaten to kill one another. In acquiescing in the balance of terror .
we become irresponsible parents. coldhearted love rs, faithless
friends . and apathetic citizens.

On the surface, Schell is still blaming nuclear weapons for this condition; he believes our better instincts
are truly better, and calls for a recovery of our faith,
stolen away by the Bomb, in them and in ourselves. But
paradoxically it is Schell's own newly acquired lack of
humanistic faith that is the key to his new solution. The
Fate of the Earth despaired of "a deliberate policy" because it assumed a willfulness and even a (misguided)
rationality to having the Bomb. Schell now acknowledges that, like a little child, humanity makes mischief
not only when it wills to but sometimes just because
there's opportunity: "It is the very existence of the arsenals, rather than any intention to use them, that makes
their use possible." Sophisticated Augustinian truth is
just this sort of insight into pointless, willy-nilly evil.
And it suggests as an answer that we trust our abiding
knowledge of physics to have "ruined" war in a way that
lays the foundation for permanent peace. The "scientific destiny" that gives us the Bomb, while still "a kind
of second fall from grace," is now seen as a fortunate
fall.
In essence, Schell independently discovers Dyson's
"Live and Let Live" strategy, in which existing weapons
are treated as bargaining chips in negotiations for a
nuclear-free but defensively armed world-a world in
which nuclear "cheating" is deterred by eventual, not
instant, rearmament and retaliation. Both authors convincingly argue for this strategy and also stress that a
nuclear-free world would be good not only in itself, but
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also as an arena in which creative things could happen
politically-whether in favor of world government or
of some other final answer to the problem of war. Ultimately the ethicist hopes not only that human activity
can be spared the pointlessness in which nuclear weapons drape it, but also that it can turn around and convert the pointlessness of the situation into some kind of
sense and value.

v
The relationship of prophet to ethicist is that both
deal in something like theology. Indeed, writings on
nuclear issues are so nearly theological that to compare
them with fifth-century churchly disputes is scarcely
analogy. Theology is the attempt to fathom man's relation to ultimate things. That the Bomb is an ultimate
thing is taken for granted when we consider it merely
as a device. As this sort of ultimate, it becomes the object of our widely acknowledged fatalism ~nd fear, as
well as of a style of strategic calculation that has often
been seen to resemble the kind of "theology" that counts
angels on pinheads.
But considered as a symbol, the Bomb begins to
emerge as the kind of ultimate to which we can understand humanity devoting admiration and reverence
also. From this viewpoint we can reconcile Schell's "dagger" remark, and its implication that the victim/perpetrator distinction is false, with Dyson's notion of the
"glitter" and "fun" of nuclear weapons. Loving the
Bomb involves us all, for several reasons which to some
extent doubtless touch others besides Americans:
l) The psychological appeal of the weapons themselves.
This includes, first, the fun of knowing about something
and getting good at using it. Weapons have always
offered this, and the offer is enhanced by sophisticated
weapons or sophisticated ideas, like nuclear physics,
on which weapons are based. Second, it includes the
"game" quality of warfare. Strangelove suggests that
military men are frustrated little boys who never quit
playing Cops and Robbers. ( WarGames denies this and
inverts the point by focusing on the serious grown man
to be found in the boy once he realizes that his games
cause trouble.)
Actually Strangelove goes further, suggesting that the
real thrill of nuclear war is perversely sexual, a "strange
love." The crazed officer thinks his sexual responses
are a Communist plot; Dr. Strangelove salaciously envisions an underground human remnant "servicing"
leaders like himself; Major Kong's warhead becomes a
giant phallus as he rides it to doom waving his cowboy
hat. (This last image is unwittingly echoed by a reallife, defense-industry "sales" film for the U.S. cruise
missile excerpted in a 1980 60 Minutes television seg-
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ment. The missile, nicknamed "Tomahawk," is seen in
awesome forward thrust to the absurd accompaniment
of theme music reminiscent of Indian war drums.) Even
WarGames unconsciously assents to this point in reverse. If Strange love's antiheroes bring the bedroom to
the War Room, WarGames 'serious hero spurns girls for
a bedroom full of gadgets. Human power saves the
world when "purified" of sex as well as politics, just as
in Strangelove sexually confused human power causes
the world to blow up.
2) The symbolic appeal of nuclear destruction. In Strangelove the end of the world is presented as a lovely sight.
Kubrick seems to suggest that this is how we view it
anyway. The idea of a glorious moral Judgment Day
has deep roots in our cu lture, as even Schell affirms,
though he thinks it a threat instead of a promise and
therefore assumes horror on our part at the evidence
that nuclear war could destroy mankind. Yet even secular man may fear the bang less than the whimper, and
prefer one to nothing at all. Historian Perry Miller,
in his essay "The End of the World ," tells of the dismay
of Western philosophers, including Newton himself,
in the face of seventeenth-century Newtonian cosmology, which seemed to show the universe grinding away
like clockwork forever. "A host of poets, theologians ,
pamphleteers rushed forward ," says Miller, "to prove
that catastrophe was still possible." Newton took up
researches in the book of Revelation while some others
hung their hopes on Halley's Comet. Today we trust
neither doom , so it has been necessary to invent one.
As the very existence of WarGames attests, nuclear
weapons routinely fit themselves into old molds of cultural myth and desire. A detailed discussion of this
phenomenon is Ira Chernus' "The Symbolism of the
Bomb" (Christian Century, Oct. 12, 1983). Chernus correctly argues that disarmament efforts must be carried
to the level of symbolism, where the Bomb "echoes"
Christianity's promise of "omnipotent power breaking
into world history, assuring future existence through
death and resurrection." Chern us' specific proposal ,
though, is that we try to reorient this symbolism by linking nuclear destruction with images of hell and disarmament with images of heaven, so that the "saving journey" becomes "a political as well as spiritual act," namely disarmament.
Leaving aside the merits of conflating the political
and spiritual, it is easy to see that this particular proposal won't work. The disarmed world is a Pelagian
dream, and heavenly salvation an Augustinian one. The
former defeats apocalypse instead of being achieved by
it, and hence does nothing to fulfill the Augustinian
yearning. Chernus thus offers as an answer what is really
the original problem, just as Schell , self-defeatingly in
this view, elevates a worldly achievement (the nuclear
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stockpile) into a cosmic event (the second fall of man).
It shows how little the prevailing humanism has reaped
from this fertile field that so recent and sound a discussion as Chernus' should undercut itself this way.
3) The problem of needing to "mean." Already discussed. This is the general case of #1 and #2. It is what
makes the end of the world potentially less frightening
(contra Schell) than the prospect of leaving the world
individually in death. It is also the source of all symbolism, hence of all refusals to place life above other
concerns. (Only a symbol-user has other concerns.) Intriguingly , much modern philosophy, inspired by advances in anthropology, linguistics, and Freudian psychology, has come to concern itself (so far as I can make
out) with studying symbol-systems and critiquing the
motives , processes, and consequences of "meaning."
These critiques may not deal explicitly with the Bomb,
though it seems appropriate that Freud himself famously anticipated nuclear weapons in 1930 when he expressed the fear that man's "instincts" and mastery of
nature could combine to destroy the world.
4) The belt'ef that the U.S. can't produce anything truly
evil. It has often been noted that high U.S. officials, like
the one who believed "enough shovels" would save us
all in a nuclear war, are given simply to denying the
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threat. To explain this, Schell notes, negatively, that
denying reality is one way around deterrence doctrine's
logical flaws. But it may also be that such denials mask a
positively held belief like #4. It may not matter here
that Americans invented nuclear weapons, nor that the
only ones so far used were American-though one
would like to rationalize these facts. But what would
matter is the speed and thoroughness with which the
Bomb was assimilated within overall U.S. policy. By
virtue of this it comes under the widespread umbrella
of belief that U.S . aims, and the broad patterns of our
policy, are by definition good, just, and perhaps divinely sanctioned.
5) The ideology of national sovereignty. The more general corollary of #4. Sovereignty is an ideology because
it sets broad patterns of thinking in people's lives. It is
the paramount modern ideology insofar as statesmen,
as Schell notes, "are ultimately prepared to bring an
end to mankind in their attempt to protect their own
countries." Basically Schell sees this fact of "protection"
as the connection between the Bomb and the system of
nation-states. But his remark also hints at a deeper link.
The illogical situation he describes (not to mention the
idiotic threat we pose to civilians who, we otherwise
agree, are oppressed victims of the very government
we would kill them in order to assail) is the reductio ad
absurdum of sovereignty's essential principle. This principle is the idea that different moral standards apply to
nations than to persons. It is also the idea that individual persons are justified or damned by reasons of state.
The first idea was critiqued in 1983 by the U.S. Catholic bishops, the second in 1945 (as it happens) by
Dwight Macdonald's classic essay, "The Responsibility
of Peoples." The "animism," or attributing of personal
qualities to states, of which Macdonald speaks is what
permits nations to identify themselves a priori as bearers
of justice, divine will, or the values of history , and then
to defend this self-concept by threatening the unjust,
godless, and history-ending slaughter of innocent millions. One's own nation becomes a quasi-religious crusade, justifying everything, and one can hope to see the
adversary, as President Reagan joked last August, "outlawed forever" and then "bombed," as though these
were the same act.
But to an animistic way of thinking, denial of another
nation's legitimacy and physical attacks on its homeland
are the same act. Warfare is corporal punishment, and
the Bomb the most satisfying paddle. Hence its real
significance. Nuclear weapons don't just physically
guard the system of sovereignty; spiritually, they embody its deepest values. We must all but worship the
State to believe as we do in the Bomb. (An anthropologist, David Mandelbaum, recently urged disarmament
researchers to do anthropological studies of the nuclear
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nations' "civic faiths." He seemed not to suspect that
the object of those faiths might turn out to be the civitas
itself.)
The first three points above elaborate on love of the
Bomb, the last two on love of country, the hand that
wields the Bomb. Other writers have spoken of both
loves, but they richly merit more sustained study, as do
the intimate links between them. Both are "strange,"
idolatrous loves, perhaps demanding no less than collective psychotherapy, and certainly the province of a
peculiarly anxious and unhappy creature.
Aware of this unhappiness, Dyson urges on us the
attitude of the low comedian. "Tragedy is not our business," and neither is redemptive comedy, in which
tragedy is overcome by cosmic infusions of Grace. Instead, he counsels a nuclear-age ethic of "sagacity and
survival." The cure for the era's malaise indeed may
bring the whole issue off the cosmic plane, where we've
been too ready to encounter it from the beginning. Nuclear weapons will cease to entail our deepest spiritual
strivings when we rediscover how to treat them solely
as mundane politics.
But perhaps the main reason the nuclear-arms race
has had such "tremendous internal momentum" is that
nuclear weapons stand at the shared apex of two of the
formative philosophical traditions of our culture- both
of which, at their extremes, lead t€l a kind of nihilism
("nihilism" being Schell's ultimate diagnosis of our
present attitude). As Geoffrey Aggeler observes, "The
Pelagian preoccupation with the tradition of liberty
and the dignity of man, like the Augustinian preoccupation with stability, will make any sacrifice for the good
of man worthwhile, including the destruction of man
himself." Both Bomb and country can simultaneously
represent human works and transcendent power; hence
each of the five tendencies cited above as psychic roots
of the peril rests on both misplaced Pelagian and debased Augustinian faiths. (Deterrence doctrine adds a
squalid Augustinian belief in the enemy's evil.)
Nuclear weapons are a point of convergence for the
two great issues of the ancient debate, human power
and original sin. For Americans especially, they crystallize and make palpable the cosmic abstraction of original sin, and they give cosmic stature to our palpable
belief in our own prowess. Because their abolition will
require both recognition of our sinfulness (our wrong
choices, and our dispirited, unhappy condition) and
also faith in our power to act , the best responses will
synthesize the two great traditions and show a grasp of
the whole debate. In the end both Dyson and Schell provide such responses. They disdain the cinema's classic
choice between sophisticated pessimism and unsophisticated hope, and instead insist on sophisticated hope.
Just to hear it spoken of is cause for reassurance.
Cl
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China in a Teacup
Richard Lee
Outdoors a million commuters
ring their bicycle bells like wind
chimes, pensioners carve the mist
out of the April air with their
morning exercises, and schoolchildren lob Frisbees and loop
ferocious dragontail kites . Indoors
an American tourist turns over in
his bed in the presidential suite
in the Diaoyutai State Guest House
in Peking, dutifully keeping the
sheets warm between the visits of
Nixon and Reagan and trying to
think some appropriately presidential thoughts.
Outside and inside it is China,
and I rise to another spring day of
unscrewing its inscrutables. The
houseboy arrives with boiling water
poured over green tea and I watch
the sodden leaves slowly sink toward
the bottom of the cup.
While those leaves perfume the
air and darken the waters my few
presidential thoughts attain only
to ironies. The first is the successful Marxist preparation of China
for necessary relations with capitalist America and the second is
the fortunate American loss of the
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Vietnam war which now makes
peace- if not the kiss of peacepossible between America and China.
It is probably only by traveling
China that an American can appreciate how unMarxist, even unMaoist, China is today. Daily life
is more Confucian than Communist, and even where the party
line is taken publicly something
softens the swaggering metaphysics
of Marxism and leaves a gentle
shrewdness in its place. One must
not be sentimental about the emerging China. It is very much under
the dictatorship of an authoritarian party whose ideology is uncongenial to much of Western
liberalism. But China is hardly a
police state, considerable freedom
and even "private enterprise" is
enjoyed at local levels, houses of
worship which do not "contaminate
the people" are open, and whatever
social regimentation occurs seems
more out of traditional decorum and
economic necessity than any political repression . China is poor but not
impoverished, and an abundant
supply of smiles apparently affords
one per person.
The most lasting Marxist influence
in China is probably its technological commitment. A technical ideology breeds techniques, and techniques breed technical necessities
in what might have remained a
feudal society. Crazy Maoism notwithstanding , much has been
achieved-a billion people adequately fed,
clothed, housed ,
schooled, and medically treated
is no mean achievement- but much
more remains for the doing. It is
this
technological
imperative
which opens China to the capitalist
West. And, blessed by the loss of
its borrowed Vietnam war, America
can become a treaty and trading
partner with China today. The
Chinese I listened to were politely
amused that America should ever
fear China but some freely admitted
their fear of America. A few were

old enough to remember their
costly border defense in the Korean
war and most were old enough to
remember-with a shuddering of
shoulders-the awesome American
military power to kill and destroy
in neighboring Vietnam. But all
seemed encouraged that American
power could "only kill and destroy"
in Vietnam but could not finally
secure another military presence
or proxy in Asia.
It is , then, with subdued fears
but also modest hopes that the
Chinese approach new relations
with America. While they are less
afraid of America militarily they
remain wary about relations with
the West culturally. So puritan a
society as China cannot look with
equanimity upon the corruption
they associate with capitalist
America in Vietnam or for that
matter with the West in Hong Kong.
It remains for the Chinese to keep
the West at bay morally while
catching up with it technologically
through trade with it economically.
It is a balancing act worthy of the
best Chinese acrobats, and I wish
the Chinese well.
As I write this column in April,
the Diaoyutai is readying for Reagan's arrival. His balancing act will
be to strengthen China technologically without making a proud people appear the pawns in the "containment of Russia"-and be as
fuzzy as we know he can be at his
best on the issue of Taiwan. In that
reverse twist somersault I wish him
well, and for his comfort delicious
sauces are served here for Peking
duck which might also serve for
eating crow.
The tea is also excellent when it
finally steeps. I am taking mine
into the garden to return the tea
leaves to the good earth. If anyone
wonders how an ordinary tourist
got booked into the Diaoyutai, so
do I. Perhaps in inscrutable China it
helps if your ancient family name is
Lee.
Cl
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Big Shoulders
John Steven Paul

To see the best that Chicago theatre had to offer this summer you had
to go to New York. Last spring, the
Steppenwolf Theatre sent Joan
Allen and their production of C.P.
Taylor's And a Nightingale Sang (see
The Cresset, April, 1983) to the Vivian
Beaumont Theatre at Lincoln Center. That production joined Steppenwolf's True West, which was also
playing New York, starring Steppenwolf's Gary Sinise and John
Matkovich and directed by Sinise
(see The Cresset, September, 1982.)
In March of this year, Matkovich
returned to New York playing Biff
to Dustin Hoffman's Willy in Death
of a Salesman (see The Cresset, April ,
1984), where he was acclaimed as a
new star. On the afternoon following Salesman 's Broadway premiere,
Malkovich was examining the stage
of the Circle Repertory Theatre in
Sheridan Square where he was to
begin directing a revival of Steppenwolf's production of Balm in
Gilead by Lanford Wilson (see The
Cresset, October, 1981).
The Steppenwolf productions
were not the only ones looking back
over their shoulders at us from the
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theatre pages of the New York Times
this summer. The two most prominent non-musical productions currently on Broadway were born last
spring at the Goodman Theatre.
Begun at the Goodman Studio, the
production of David Rabe's Hurtyburly was an extraordinary enterprise which combined the talents of
director Mike Nichols and several
important younger actors including
Christopher Walken, William Hurt,
Harvey Keitel , and Sigourney
Weaver.
The other Goodman product won
the Pulitzer Prize for drama in 1984.
This is David Mamet's Glengarry
Glen Ross, which is playing at the
John Golden Theatre. While Hurtyburly borrowed the Goodman Theatre for a tryout, Glengarry Glen Ross
was a true resident theatre production : Goodman artiStic director
Gregory Mosher directed, Chicago
designers did the sets and costumes,
and a superior group of Chicagobased actors comprised the cast.
David Mamet is among the two or
three most important playwrights
working in the American theatre
and a major work might be expected
to go to New York, but he is also a
resident playwright with a clear
sense of his relationship to a community. (Although Mamet now lives
in Vermont, he is Associate Artistic
Director of the Goodman.) In fact ,
Glengarry Glen Ross grew from
Mamet's own experience as an unemployed actor working in a real
estate office in Chicago.
In his latest play, Mamet returns
to the world of his earlier Amen·can
Buffalo: petty American capitalism.
Buffalo is about three small-time
burglars and hustlers and the resale
store that they use to front their illegitimate activities. Glengarry Glen
Ross is about a different kind of
hustler, the real estate salesman selling land in Florida, dubbed the
"Glengarry Highlands" and "Glen
Ross farms ." The language, the
ethics, and even the personalities in

the two plays are similar. And Mamet has proven that he is a master at
cultivating a rich and complex
world, albeit an inhospitable one,
from a fertile subject. Though it is
not a world we care to inhabit once
we are inside, the completeness and
the density of Mamet's milieu deaden our awareness of any reality
other than the one in which he surrounds us. With no opportunity for
peering outside it, we are left to
make of this world what we can.
Mamet's real estate business is a
man's world . And Glengarry Glen
Ross is a man's play, about men's
pain, men's needs, men's codes, and
men's talk. It is appropriate that the
City of the Big Shoulders should
export a men's play to New York,
though these men don't work in the
steel mills and the stockyards of
Carl Sandburg's vision . They are
laborers in the service industry,
where America is still a world leader.
Just below the wafer-thin veneer
of the civility, cordiality, and refinement required in modern social
transactions, Mamet sees a primitive, pre-modern world. In this
world men go bravely out to hunt
and bring the kill back to camp.
Some of the men are fitter for the
task than others; the strong thrive,
the weak fail. Glengarry Glen Ross is
a drama of the struggle for survival.
Mamet's dramatic language is
sufficiently big-shouldered to embody this drama of men in mortal
conflict. Their talk reflects a large
catalog of male motives. It consists
of attacks, defenses , poses, violations , cries, and consolations. These
men philosophize, posture, dissemble, teach, brag, and support. Simultaneously, they use the language
of the conqueror, the king, and the
rapist. It's all talk, but it's not cheap.
Talk is the civilian's way of waging
life's wars.
The language operates on the prelinguistic level of vocal utterance,
measured in terms of volume, inflection, rate, and rhythm. The
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playwright is very much aware of
the pulse of a line. His printed text,
carefu lly marked with italics to
emphasize the accented sy llabl es,
reads like a boxing match. His characters sound like animals in the
struggle for survival, often crowing, and whimpering, and snarling.
If the language is deliberately poor
in image and metaphor, it is rhythmically vita l and gesturally rich. It
is written for the muscles , not for
the mind.
Act I is a series of three linguistic
confrontations which takes place in a
secluded booth of a neighborhood
Chinese restaurant. The first pair
of combatants is made up of Shelly
Levene, a fiftyish , grizzled hunter
of long experience, and the real estate office executive, John Williamson , a man in his early forties. The
latter's language is softer, quieter,
and refined. He has never been out
"on the street." Levene has not won
a battle lately. He's desperate ; he
needs money; he's afraid of being
fired ; hi manhood is being challenged; he hurts. Worse, only the
sa lesmen who have successfu lly
closed deals receive the leads on
potential customers most likely to
purchase: catch 22. Levene reminds
the younger Williamson of past service to the company and his successful sales record of yesteryear. The
older man protests, pleads, and
whimpers. The younger man is merci less and implacable. In a final act
of prostration, Levene bribes Williamson. Williamson cooly refuses
to respond until he sees the color of
Levene's money. The shaming is
complete.
A new pair of conversants replaces
the first in the cherry-red-vinyl
booth. Moss and Aaronow, two sa lesmen in their fifties, commiserate
about their losing streaks. Moss,
mouthy , florid , and angry, and
Aaronow, mousy, grey, and frightened, lay their problems at Williamson's feet. He has given them deadbeat leads: "Polacks and Indians,"
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people who keep their money in a
sock, who'd never make an "investment." And now another indignity:
a sales contest where salesmen who
close deals move up toward the top
of a contest board . (The winners
receive luxury cars.)
Moss and Aaronow speak the language of position: salesmen who
don't close deals are down, but good
salesmen come back from losing
streaks; winners get up on the board ;
losers get bumped offthe board. No
sales no board; no board no leads;
no leads no sales. It hurts , says Moss.
Aaronow's pain shows in the lines
of his haggard face . Somebody
should hurt them back, says Moss.
Leads on potentia l buyers are the
currency of this realm. Leads mean
a chance not only to survive but to
succeed. People would do almost
anything to get the leads; other people would pay to have those leads.
Somebody, Moss says, ought to burglarize the office.

Recently, David Mamet
has said that "the older
I get, the more in love
I get with the traditional
aspects of dramaturgy."
In the third scene of the first act a
pair of younger men sit at the tables.
One of them is Richard Roma , currently the most successful salesman
at the office. In this scene he is the
somewhat smug venditor cogitatio,
reflecting on himself and his position vis-a-vis the universe. In his own
natural brand of existentialist discou rse-studded with earthy references to sex, food , defecation, and
shelter-Roma laments the separation of modern man from any overarching universe of meaning, remarks on the apparent randomness
of experience and the prevalence of
chance, and affirms the validity of
freely chosen action. His holding

forth is not entirely reflexive. He
addresses himself to the man sitting
next to him , J ames Lingk. Though
he doesn't know him , Roma reaches
out to the sad little man, who sits
non-plussed and captivated, as if at
the feet of a brilliant academ ician .
When he senses that he has immobilized his prey with his rhetorical
arrows, Roma springs on him ,
brandishing a brochure on the Glengarry Highlands, Florida. Lingk
succumbs.
Recently, David Mamet has said
that "the older I get, the more in
love I get with the traditional aspects of dramaturgy." In many ways
Glengarry Glen Ross is a traditionally
structured work. In Act I, Mamet
establishes the conflicts: the salesmen versus their own business,
which by its very nature oppresses
them. He goes on to develop the
possible action that the salesmen
might take against that business.
Perhaps more importantly, in his
expositional act, the playwright
establishes the context in which
such action cou ld take place. The
social context is marked by cutthroat
competition and malign indifference to the fate of one's fellows.
There is also the linguistic context,
the universe of language which represents action . Mamet's characters
are what they say they are and do
what they say they do. For Mamet,
language, to quote Kenneth Burke,
is truly symbolic action. The climactic scene in Act II will mark the high
point of the conflict and also the
most incisive linguistic exchange.
In the beginning of Act II, Shelly
Levene struts in with a contract in
his maw. He has brought it back
from a battle with two deadbeats prospects to whom no one has previously been able to sell property .
His reward is the privilege of telling
the office about it. Suddenly he
looks around and starts at the condition of the real estate office, which
has been trashed by burglars. Among
other things, the leads have been
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stolen, a theft of such seriousness
that it is tantamount to a capital
crime. A Chicago police detective is
"interviewing" the salesmen one by
one as they arrive at the office. Because they all so desperately want
and need the prime leads, they are
all suspects and they are all victims.
But Levene demands his victory
festival. Bardlike he narrates the
details of his dealing: the circling,
the feinting, the attack, the retreat,
and finally the close. Shelly "the
Machine" Levene is back and he can
taste each word of the story. Moss
storms out of the police interview
cursing his treatment. Levene goes
on with his story. Aaronow staggers
out of the interview complaining of
gestapo tactics. Levene continues,
having now won the attention of the
young hot shot Roma. The younger
man, though he has problems of his
own, understands his role in this
victory ritual.
It takes a major threat to jar the
salesman out of his hero's discourse.
Roma spies just such a threat walking up the street in the person of
James Lingk. Through the building
wall Roma can sense that Lingk has
changed his mind about the Glengarry Highlands deal. With barely
a prompt from Roma, Levene assumes an appointed role in the
younger salesman's impromptu
drama designed to deflect the wavering customer from his intention
to cancel the deal. Levene plays
"Morton, the senior vice-president
of American Express," who has
bought a great deal of property
from Roma's firm. Roma is a "friend
of the family" who must hurry Mr.
Morton to the airport before attending his wife's birthday party on the
north shore. Though the outer office
looks like the inside of a food processor and there's an interrogation
going on in the inner office, Roma
and Levene are able to play their
scene with a cool virtuosity that
deters Lingk from his mission. When
he can get a word in, the man begs
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Roma to understand that it is Mrs.
Lingk who has insisted that the deal
be cancelled.
Mrs. Lingk (who does not appear)
evidently understands something
about men and business. For she
has further instructed her husband
that he not talk to the salesman. Simply cancel the deal; no negotiations.
Should Roma not cooperate, Mrs.
Lingk will call the state's attorney.
Roma's objective is precisely that
which Mrs. Lingk has feared. The
salesman wants to get the customer
out of the office and to the Chinese
restaurant, the talking arena. But
Lingk has been programmed by his
wife to repeat: "cancel the deal." In
an attempt to break the man free of
his wife's dictates, Roma assures
Lingk that no action has been taken
on the deal, that the contract is still
in the office, and that their relationship has nothing to do with any deal :
Forget the deal. Jimmy. (Pause.) Forget
the deal ... you know me. The deal's dead.
Am I talking about the deal? That's over.
Please. Let's talk about you. Come on .
(Pause. Roma rises and starts walking to·
ward the front door.) Come on. (Pause.)
Come on. Jim. (Pause.) I want to tell you
something. Your life is your own . You have
a contract with your wife. You have certain things you do jointly , you have a bond
there ... and there are other things . Those
things are yours. You needn't feel ashamed,

Lizards in Love
A lusty lizard curls round
a mottled lizardess He
green - his carmine disc
brazen as a clay pigeon awaits the shot
pale unicornt>
\fill never fire at greening lovers careening
dangerously.

Fanny Ventadour

you needn't feel that you're being untrue.
or that she would abandon you if she knew .
This is your life. ( Pause.) Yes. Now I want
to talk to you because you're obviously upset and that concerns me. Now let's go.
Right now. (Lingk gets up and they start
for the door.)

Roma is a master manipulator. If
he is absolutely cynical, then his
rhetorical skill is even more remarkable. He appeals to Lingk, not as a
customer, but as a human being, as
an individual, a free agent, a man.
This is how men talk to men. Roma
reminds him that he is free to make
contracts, to act joint! y, and to honor
commitments. He is also, however,
free to act independently; in fact,
Roma implies, the world expects
that a man will act independently,
at least on occasion. Lingk's ob~ious
discomfort-he is unable to choke
out more than a three-word phraseindicates that he knows and feels
that expectation , but is unable to
fulfill it. The man is no longer in
need of a professional real estate
salesman, but of a professional counselor, someone who understands
men's problems. Roma offers his
services. There will be time enough,
he thinks, to revitalize the deal.
As the men are about to leave the
office and Roma and Levene see
their cooperation about to be successful, Williamson enters the room.
He sees that Lingk is upset and
cheerily assures him that he needn't
worry about the office burglary. His
contract has been sent to the bank
and is well on the way to being finalized. Lingk's face falls. He turns to
Roma for a confirmation or denial
and reads it in the salesman's angry
countenance. In spite of the fact that
it is Lingk who has been wronged,
the prospect of ending his relationship with Roma is loathsome to him.
Sensing that his wife has undermined manliness, he apologizes profusely to Roma for disappointing
him and rushes from the office. With
him goes Roma's last chance for the
deal.
Williamson has committed an
21

unpardonable sin; he has fouled a
deal when it was at a critical juncture. Roma's anger would seem to
be leading toward a physical assault,
but instead he powers his language
with debilitating insults. As James
Lingk slams the office door behind
him , Roma berates Williamson with
a viciousness that surpasses anything
spoken in the play . In addition to
hurling at him nearly every obscenity imaginable, Roma makes a
particular point of naming him a
"child ," whose lack of experience is
inhibiting men who are trying to
earn a living.

Perhaps twenty per ce nt
of all the words in the
play are derivations of
that most famous of all
A nglo-Saxon obscenities.
Mamet' s characters use it
in every part of speech.

At the point of Roma's verbal
assault on Williamson, Mamet's language is unprintable in a family
magazine such as The Cresset. Indeed,
the crudity of the play's language
provoked considerable comment in
the press and considerable uncomfortable giggling from the matinee
audiences. In kind, the language
isn 't much different than that deleted from the White House Transcripts when they were published in
1974. But the quantity and the prevalence of this obscene language is
notable in a stage play, though it
probably wouldn't be so notable in
an actual business office or in an
out of the way booth in an actual
Chinese restaurant. Perhaps twenty
per cent of all the words in the play
are derivations of that most famous
of all Anglo-Saxon obscenities.
Mamet's characters use the word in
nearly every part of speech: verb,
noun, adjective, adverb, gerund, etc.
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One might observe that the extensive use of such language reveals
the characters' limited vocabulary.
Or, that in men-only business situations , it is natural for men to derive
their lingua franca from the locker
room and the dormitory: boys will
be boys. But it seems to me that
Mamet has chosen his language
quite carefully as a way of delineating his world. The characters of
Glengarry Glen Ross habitually employ the language of rape. Their
obscenities are drained of their
power as expletives, but they serve
as painful evidence of the frequency
with which human beings are violated in this world. That rape language should permeate this men's
play so thoroughly testifies to the
fact that, in American society, the
issue of rape transcends the gender
gap.
It is Levene, by the way, who has
burglarized the office and stolen the
leads. He has sold them to a competitor in the real estate business
for five thousand dollars. He becomes so exuberant in verbal attacks on Williamson that he slips up
and gives himself away. Levene lives
by the word and dies by the word.
Williamson, the sharper of the two,
catches the inadvertent admission
of guilt immediately. After giving
Levene an opportunity to debase
himself by begging for mercy, he
sneers and goes into the police detective to disclose his evidence.
First, he takes a moment to inform
Levene that the buyers on his last
deal are certifiably insane and insolvent.
The denouement is brief. The
problem of being a man is that when
you'Fe really down there is no one
to talk to. Big shoulders are meant
only to bt:: cried on. Levene silently
contemplates his gloomy future.
Roma announces that he'll be at the
restaurant. Aaronow, in a voice all
weltschmerz, pronounces the final
word on this world. "0 God , I hate
this job."

••
••

Christianity and
Politics
Gail McGrew Eifrig
Long ago, in the presidential campaign of 1960, a good deal was said
about religion in the public realm.
As I remember it, some people were
exercised over the possibility of a
Roman Catholic occupying the
White House, and the airwaves and
newspapers were agitatedly filled
with speculation on the subject. I
had not seen, or perhaps more accurately, had not noticed much political action at that time, and so the
rumors and speculations took on a
somewhat larger importance than
they deserved.
I assumed that what many writers
wrote about during the campaign
would actually turn out to be of consequence in the course of the next
four years' presidency. Would the
Pope require John Kennedy to do
something that the nation's interest
should forbid? Could Kennedy be
loyal to his oath of office when he
had an allegiance to a foreign power?
Events proved the fearmongers to
be naively inaccurate; as Americans
we were to experience assassinations
and Vietnam, but not a takeover of
the White House by the Vatican.
This campaign has seen another
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resurgence of interest in the relative
places of religion and politics in
public life. We have heard one candidate accuse the President of being
unchristian because of his policies
on federal welfare. The governor of
New York has been accused by his
bishop of not being a true churchman because of a public position on
abortion. A leader on what has been
called "the religious right" has insisted that a Supreme Court justice
should, before taking the oath of
office, swear to uphold a particular
moral position.
These charges and countercharges
may well subside after the election,
but their foundations are revelatory
about the nature of religion in
America. During my lifetime, the
phrase "under God" was inserted
into the Pledge of Allegiance, and
school prayer was deleted from the
school day, so that in my own history
the ambivalence and uncertainty
about public religion has been pretty
neatly demonstrated. What appears
striking about these instances, and
others like them, is that they have a
place so near the center of American
political thinking, rather than on
the fringes.
An oration like Jesse Jackson's at
the Democratic National Convention would be nearly unthinkable
in other political cultures, with the
exception of the Middle Eastern
countries now struggling with the
revitalization of a super-militant
Islam, or the bitter jeremiads of
Northern Ireland. That a large
group of mainstream Americans, all
of whom can be called members of
one of the two largest political parties anywhere, listen to a long sermon with enthusiasm is a remarkable phenomenon. It would seem
more likely in nineteenth-century
revival history, but in twentiethcentury San Francisco? The assumption of a religious stance has taken
on great importance in the American
political scene.
Surely this is demonstrated by the
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way in which the two major parties
have both "recovered" a religious
outlook. In the last election, the
Democrats appeared to be a motley
group of weirdos and oddballs, free
of hang-ups, turned on, tuned in to
every cause, however strange. How
did their candidate get to be Jimmy
Carter? The Republicans, ever
shrewd, co-opted religion for their
side like a piece of copyrighted
campaign literature. All the people
who cared about apple pie, motherhood, the flag, and school prayer
were voting on the Republican side.
Before this present campaign,
however, the Democrats decided
that they should have God on their
side too, and they made sure that
everybody knew that Democrats had
as much religion as Republicans.
Ferraro's good Catholic girlhood
became prominent before she accused Reagan of not being a Christian, and Jackson's rhetoric nailed
down what was already in place before the convention. You didn't, it
turned out, have to be a Republican
to pray or to call on the name of the
Lord at a public meeting.
The odd thing about all this cen-

Making Metaphors
The moon is the Sacrament
given by intinction,
dipped in the pale wine
of low clouds at sunset.
It rises and is full,
a perfect wafer
poised between heaven and earth,
between hand and mouth.
The gray plains on its face,
you ask, always the realist.
Call them the very human sweat
from a new pastor's fingers.

Ruth Nicholson

ters, as so many things do, on definitions. In the accusations and counter-accusations, religion is usually
made synonymous with Christianity.
But what definition of Christianity
is being used when Ferraro says Reagan is not a Christian? She implied
that a Christian is a person whose
efforts go to make sure that the poor
are fed, that the sick are cared for,
that the helpless receive help. And
there is the best scriptural precedent
for such a definition. "By their fruits
ye shall know them," Jesus replied
when he was asked how to recognize
his followers.
Using the criterion above, though,
is tricky. Is Reagan a Christian President when he personally seeks to
relieve the suffering of the poor? Or
when his official policies attempt to
redress the inevitable suffering that
other official policies almost inevitably produce? Can government
be Christian, or can only governors
be Christian, if to be Christian
means to care for the helpless?
And who are the helpless? Ferraro is caught having to say that her
Christian concern for those in need
focuses on women who don't want to
bear a particular child, and not on
the child whose mother does not
want to bear it. She may have a different preference as a private Christian, but as a public Christian, which
is what she wants Reagan to be, her
preference is for one group rather
than the other, and there is not
widespread agreement on which of
those two groups is more in need.
If the definition of a Christian is
that person whose primary concern
is the well-being of others, then that
definition is of little help in clarifying the position a Christian ought
to take on a public issue. In fact,
there seems little about the definition which is specifically Christian
at all, since it looks like an ethical
or moral imperative to which almost
any religiously sympathetic person,
or any humanist for that matter,
would claim adherence.
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Why is it Christian to want (or not
want) the MX missile? One would
think that is the kind of prudential
issue on which reasonable people
could disagree without tying the
matter to the quality of one's Christianity. Is opposition to the death penalty a Christian position? The Catholic bishops have come very close to
saying so. But is it true that reverence for life is the keystone of Christian faith? If so, my Buddhist neighbor can be my Christian brother.
It appears that this campaign
should have taught us, if we had
not learned it before, that Christianity cannot be co-opted for one political position or another. One of the
new things we might have learned
is that no institution, not even the
church itself, can define our public
duty by means of a definition of the
faith. This lesson, which Protestants
have been struggling to live with for
centuries, is being learned by our
Roman brethren, as Mario Cuomo's
wrestling with his bishop demonstrates. If it were so easy to determine how the good Christian should
vote, it would indeed be easy to tell
the sheep from the goats, easy to
decide which party to support, easy
to know which protest to join, which
crusade to invest in.

This campaign should
have taught us, if we
had not learned it before,
that Christianity cannot
be co-opted politically.
But even that kind of ease is denied to us Christians. "Follow me,"
has hundreds of paths, each of them
different. Crucial in the definition
of the Christian is the admonition
to bear the cross, and that is an admonition which strikes no responsive chord in mainstream American
political life, however fervently it
seems to call itself Christian.

C:
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Louisiana Music
Keith Paulson-Thorp

Comparisons between the arts of
northern and southern Europe are
an inevitable part of any humanities
education. While the South produced an endless elegance and almost superficial simplicity, artists
in the North struggled with more
severe structural and philosophical
dilemmas; while Corelli and Vivaldi
were aligning sequences and repetitions which glide effortlessly
through time, in the formal complexity and contrapuntal detail of
the northern masters we find monuments of temporal manipulation.
Given the rampant eclecticism of
modern art, it may be inappropriate,
particularly in the United States
where regions are not so strongly
delineated by ethnicity or language,
to attempt a geographic demarcation
of style. Nonetheless, instructive
comparisons can be made between
northern and southern attitudes toward the arts in general. The intense
growth of artistic institutions in the
North during the first half of this
century was closely linked to industrial prosperity and extensive dis-
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posable income. The post-World
War II transformation of the agrarian South into a modern industrial
complex with ever rising population
and diversified economic growth
might well allow us to expect a similar burgeoning of the arts here. The
Cinderella-like transformation of
the South, however, is far from invulnerable, as we witness in the difficulties plaguing the 1984 New
Orleans World Exposition.
An integral part of the new South,
Louisiana has become less like a
foreign country for outsiders than
it was in the past, but one is still
easily impressed by the state's
uniqueness. Visually Louisiana is
seductive at any time of year. Cypress and Live Oak trees, festooned
with Spanish moss, stand in exotic
array along the bayous and swamps
hosting the phenomenal assortment
of wildlife which has justified the
state's reputation as a sportsman's
paradise. The pace of life here is
very slow; time seems to be a plentiful commodity.
The most striking transformations
in this semi-tropical paradise have
occured in the area known as the
"Cajun triangle," an area extending
along the Gulf of Mexico from below New Orleans to Lake Charles
in the West and to Alexandria and
the Red River in the north. The
Hollywood stereotype of Cajuns as
barefoot swamprats who sleep on
moss-stuffed mattresses belies a complex culture which is attempting to
balance new-found prosperity and
an insurgence of external influences
with the difficult task of preserving
a cultural identity.
The Acadians ("Cajun" is a derivative) settled in Louisiana during
the eighteenth century following
their expulsion by the British from
Nova Scotia (originally called Acadia) for refusing to renounce Roman
Catholicism and swear allegiance
to the British crown. Expecting a
sympathetic welcome from fellow
Frenchmen in New Orleans, the
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Cajuns were afforded a less than
hospitable reception by the classconscious Creoles and were obliged
to settle across the vast Atchafalaya
swamp on the fertile coastal plains.
The Cajuns developed a close-knit
social fabric and devised ingenious
solutions to problems of food and
housing in the unpredictable Louisiana climate.
When oil was discovered in Louisiana in the twentieth century, social
and political structures had to adapt.
In the city of Lafayette, known as the
"hub city" of the Cajuns, the impact
of oil dollars is everywhere in evidence. This once sleepy college
town has recently boasted one of
the highest concentrations of millionaires, fastest growth rates, and
lowest unemployment rates in the
country. Shopping centers and restaurants have proliferated as oil and
office complexes spread through
the city.
One would expect this dramatic
increase in disposable income to
trickle down to the arts. If we first
compare the economic boom here
with conditions in the North earlier
in the century, however, we discover
some glaring differences, differences which do not bode well for the
rapid growth of the arts. The nouveau riche of the Gulf Coast generally became wealthy overnight as a result of the highly volatile petrochemical industry , whereas the
wealth of the northern industrialists was achieved through patience,
dedication, and ingenuity, a view
as much inclined toward the future
as toward the immediate return.
Whereas new wealth in the North
still tends to imitate older wealth in
order to acquire social respectability, the new wealth of the South is
arrogant, proud to be "just plain
folks," to have amassed a fortune
without having amassed education
or refinement.
There is , as a result, less social
incentive to patronize the arts here
than in the North. Arts patronage
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by the old plantation aristocracy is
somehow viewed as one of the frailties of the old South. Without the
lure of tax benefits, private and corporate support of the arts in Louisiana would be slight. Unbridled
prosperity historically inculcates an
insulation of the upper classes
against the needs of the world at
large and against that natural curiosity which might stimulate culturally significant growth in the
arts. However, the recent oil glut
has tempered economic prosperity
and facilitated a period of reassessment.
The friction that has existed between the fragile veneer of formality
and politeness which recall the Victorian leisure of the plantation culture and the raw energy of the hightech industrialism which is supplanting it seems to be wearing
down. Peaceful coexistence is in the
best interests of both, for both are
veneers which have worn precariously thin themselves, the first having outlived its utility as a social
adhesive and the latter being built
on an ecological foundation which
could disappear as quickly as it
sprang into existence. The arts provide a logical meeting ground between the two, a civilizing influence
which welcomes prosperity but
seeks to imbue the resulting society
with an inner strength of character
and sensitivity.
The Cajuns are well aware that
prosperity has come largely because
of the influx of outside influences,
yet this same influx has created a
resurgence of interest in what it
means to be "cajun." For more than
a century, the French underpinnings
of Louisiana were pervasive enough
to absorb waves of German, Irish,
Spanish, and Italian immigrants, to
assimilate each of these without sacrificing its own integrity. Following
World War II, however, the primary
goal here, as in most of the country,
was to dissolve into the American
melting pot, to quell the peculiar-

1t1es which make Cajuns unique .
In the last decade, all that is Cajun
has once again become very chic.
This is particularly evident in the
renewed interest in preserving the
Cajun language. Twenty years ago
children were discouraged from
speaking Cajun French in public
and were often punished for speaking it in school. Now the language is
again part of the curriculum in even
the younger grades, and local radio
and television broadcasts include
substantial amounts of French programming. Sadly, these efforts may
be too little too late, for decreasing
numbers of Cajuns, and these mainly the elderly and illiterate, continue
to speak the unique Cajun patois.
If the language is having difficulty
surviving the onslaught of modernization, Cajun music is enjoying an
unprecedented success. The traditional Cajun approach to life is
summed up best in the ubiquitous
expression "laissez les bons temps
roulez!" A carnival atmosphere
reigns here not only during the
week-long Mardi Gras festivities,
during which virtually the entire
community comes to a halt, but also
during the months of festivals which
follow. Each community honors its
local flavor with a festival. The festival may be held in honor of alligators, crawfish, frogs, shrimp, rice,
sugar cane, boudin sausage, or a
host of other distinctly Cajun favorites. The festivals attract people
from across the nation and consist
largely of craft shows, mass consumption of the world-renowned
local cuisines, and uninhibited dancing and merrymaking. It is hard to
imagine any event which could lay
claim to being authentically Cajun
which would not incorporate music
and dancing.
There may be Cajuns who resent
the intrusion of ethnologists from
across the country beating paths to
Louisiana to collect and catalogue
local musics and folklore, but few
are averse to the resulting boom in
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the local entertainment industry.
Lately, Cajun performers have been
honored with many major awards,
including several Grammies. Cajun
music falls into numerous stylistic
categories, including several hybrids (such as "zydeco") which have
incorporated elements of more popular rock styles, but most of these
share the same basic timbres: accordions, guitars, and fiddles. The music often incorporates microtonal inflections to a degree which most
audiences would not tolerate in art
musics, and a perpetual rhythmic
drive with frequent misplaced metric units. The harmony is extremely
limited, moving lazily between as
few as three or four chords in a single work. This music may have developed in comparative isolation,
but it shares more than a cursory
similarity to Appalachian and
Canadian folk musics.
The renaissance of Cajun awareness has afforded an almost excessive
amount of attention to local folk
music. For the outsider and the native alike, Cajun music may represent the soul of Cajun identity, but
for those of us who are involved with
concert music, it is simply another
contender for a limited supply of
time and dollars . As the novelty begins to wane for the renaissance
movement , the pendulum may
swing more favorably toward art
music. There are signs that this is
already beginning to occur.
Artistic trends in Louisiana have
favored the preservation of the past
as a buffer against the new . What is
peculiar in all of this ethnic preservation, however, is that some very
significant aspects of Louisiana's
past are usually overlooked. St.
Martinville, the quiet little town on
the banks of Bayou Teche that
forms the backdrop for the final
scene of Longfellow's Evangeline, is
today a typical Cajun town. Not so
in the eighteenth century, when St.
Martinville was home to scores of
wealthy French aristocrats fleeing
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the revolution and scores of wealthy
Caribbean planters fleeing slave
rebellions. For decades remnants of
continental culture were carefully
cultivated in "le Petit Paris." The
ancient building on Main street
which now houses the Bienvenue
Brothers Clothiers was once the
"French opera house, " host to many
performers brought from their
engagements at New Orleans' opera
house. It is doubtful that any real
productions of any scope could have
been offered in such a small building, but this was a significant effort
to build artistic institutions in Louisiana along European lines. Following the Civil War these institutions
disappeared, mainly for economic
reasons. Seldom viewed as an essential part of the local heritage, they
are generally ignored today by all
but a handful.

The renaissance of Cajun
awareness has afforded
an almost excessive
amount of attention
to local folk music.
For decades those who would
build artistic institutions in Acadiana have worked in isolation and
frustration. The oil boom has
brought not only the necessary cash
flow but also an accompanying collection of new talent and ideas. The
struggling few have multiplied in
numbers and now constitute a base
of energy and interest from which
permanent artistic institutions will
arise.
One important gauge of this is
the development of semi-professional symphony orchestras. The Baton
Rouge Symphony, which has struggled for years to attain a level of fair
compensation and a diversified season, has recently reinforced the core
of the orchestra by hiring first one
and then a second full-time string

quartet. Most of the personnel for
these ensembles was drawn , predictably, from the graduating ranks
of the Louisiana State University
School of Music. Like graduates at
most regional colleges, these young
musicians are aware of the difficulties which may be anticipated in
building a solid experience portfolio, and they welcome the symphony's new program.
The benefits are not just limited
to the orchestra and the university,
for the city and region as a whole
have also benefitted. These string
players perform at local schools to
build audiences for the future and
also present concerts of chamber
music. In addition, they perform
with the Vermilion Chamber Orchestra, a splinter group of the Baton
Rouge Symphony, which has presented concerts in Lafayette during
the past two seasons. Even northern
cities of moderate size have rarely
attempted such innovative measures; they were unprecedented
throughout the South until our
time. Even the city of Lake Charles,
which has long felt like the poor
step-child of the Louisiana boom,
has been able to start a semi-professional orchestra in the last few
years, and Lafayette has formed a
blue-ribbon panel of prominent citizens to oversee its new orchestra
which is scheduled to debut this
month.
All of this growth, like so much in
the South, has its paradox, for we
are reminded that the state's only
ranking professional orchestra is
annually on the brink of financial
collapse. The directors in New Orleans have grasped at straws in placing Philippe Entremont on the
podium. His sparkling career as a
pianist gave no hint that he might
be a competent music director. His
subsequent work has done little to
change that impression, but Entremont at least can offer name recognition and, even more important in
Louisiana, a French name at that.
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The recent expansion of artistic
activity is seen here in programming
of all types. In Lafayette, the Fine
Arts Foundation, headed by an
energetic young Englishman who
has parlayed a miniscule budget
ten years ago into a sizable series of
chamber, solo, orchestral, and dance
concerts, has presented such major
talents as the American Ballet Theatre, the Prague Symphony, Pinchas
Zuckermann, and Mikhail Baryshnikov. Lafayette's Community Concerts and the University of Southwestern Louisiana also sponsor major performance series to provide
cultural opportunities which are
exemplary for a city of 100,000.
In spite of this, audiences for
everything except ballet remain
small and the process of educating
the public is very slow. The Acadiana Arts Council, an umbrella organization which coordinates arts
efforts in the region, sponsors numerous programs which send professional artists into the schools to explain and demonstrate their work.
Because music and the arts are still
viewed as frills and there are few
curricula which incorporate longrange arts instruction, we cannot
expect such token programs to make
a major impact. At present, public
school music in Acadiana, where it
exists at all, is limited to choirs and
marching bands. Even concert band
programs receive limited attention
due to the demands made on students by the marching organizations,
which remain active not only
throughout football season, but also
during the Mardi Gras celebrations.
Music is treated as a practical commodity, not as an art, and it is nigh
impossible to instill a respect for
musical art in this context or to expand a student's horizons to a point
where he might be curious to experience other musical delights.
On the peripheries, the influx of
young talent has enlivened activity
in new and early musics in Louisiana. New Orleans recently hosted a
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sizable early music festival in conjunction with the World Exposition
and the accompanying Sun King
Exhibition being held at the Cabildo
on Jackson Square. Some of the top
soloists and ensembles in the country participated. Smaller universitybased ensembles are attempting to
lure audiences in smaller cities to
this neglected repertoire.

If we are witnessing a
musical reawakening in
Louisiana's secular arts
institutions, the same is
more difficult to see in
the realm of church music.
As with efforts in early music,
composers and new music enthusiasts are beginning to realize the
importance of joint efforts in realizing their goals. Louisiana State
University has sponsored a new
music festival each spring for many
years. L.S.U. has steadily built the
festival into a major event, but has
not actively encouraged participation from universities outside of
Baton Rouge. Because of extensive
turnover in music faculties throughout Louisiana in the last few years,
there are now enough musicians
who are not limited by the past
politics of the state educational system that we may expect increasing
cooperation.
Last March a consortium of university faculties formed the Central
Gulf Theory Society to provide a
forum for new ideas and researches
in music theory . Similar societies
have operated in other parts of the
country for many years. The inaugural meeting of the CGTS attracted theorists and composers
from four states and focused on a
wide variety of historical and practical topics . Most important for the
participants was the opportunity to
meet with other artists who share

common aims and problems and to
discuss solutions. A resounding success, the meetings will become annual events.
If local performing organizations
have made little effort to incorporate contemporary music into their
repertoires, it has been because of
inadequate lobbying efforts on the
part of composers. This, too, is showing signs of improvement. The
alumni chapter of the music fraternity of Sigma Alpha Iota has
sponsored a very successful concert
of works by a half-dozen Lafayette
composers and has planned at least
two similar concerts in the near future. Likewise, the new director of
the fledgling Acadiana Symphony
in Lafayette has commissioned a
work from a local composer to be
premiered by his orchestra during
its inaugural year.
Each of these achievements may
seem inconsequential taken singly,
but taken together they mark a significant new direction for the arts
in a state which until recently was
better known for rampant illiteracy,
political graft, and cultural shortsightedness. They signal a marked
improvement for the city of Lafayette, which as recently as 1981 ranked
dead last in a survey of 277 cities in
"arts facilities" even though it stood
as high as tenth, just behind Houston, in "personal economic opportunity."

* * *
If we are witnessing a musical
renaissance in Louisiana's secular
arts institutions, the same is more
difficult to see in the realm of church
music. True, long-established programs, such as that at St. Louis Cathedral in New Orleans, continue
to thrive. This is thanks largely to
the dedication and perseverence of
a few very talented musicians, such
as the Cathedral's renowned music
director Elise Cambon. Elsewhere,
however, the reforms of Vatican II
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have practically eradicated vestiges
of the centuries-old heritage of Latin
church music.
At many churches in this predominantly Catholic part of Louisiana mass is celebrated with no
music at all. At others, the weekly
choral mass has become a geriatric
service where a nostalgic minority
struggles valiantly to preserve what
bits of the musical traditions might
be salvaged. Many priests encourage congregational singing to replace the old choral rites, but at the
scores of parishes I have observed
their efforts are met with complacency or even mild hostility. Younger generations have grown up
without strong choral traditions and
find the use of elaborate music to be
a foreign reminder of an "outmoded" practice. They prefer the
guitar accompaniments of the folk
masses which play to packed houses
at most churches. The Catholic
presses produce a barrage of folkinspired music for these services of
a quality similar to that found in
the services of other denominations.
A small number of local Catholics continue to practice the Tridentine rite, but without the moral
and financial support of the diocese
they are unable to match their liturgical preferences with the appropriate musical panoply.
At some churches fine old organs
remain silent at most services. They
often fall prey to neglect and the
relentless Louisiana climate and
are replaced by cheaper electronic
instruments. The diocese of Lafayette has recently purchased a large
Casavant organ for its cathedral, a
move which some hope will set a
precedent for the purchase of finer
instruments throughout the diocese.
Strangely, though, the cathedral
organ is larger than the building requires and could have been more
suitably proportioned, thereby freeing funds for the improvement of
instruments in parish churches as
well.
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Many local churches have trimmed
budgets by hiring local pianists
rather than trained organists to provide music at mass. As one would
expect, the quality of service playing by these musicians is quite low.
In a region where arts awareness is
a very new concept, this is not of
great concern to most parishioners.
A few larger churches, encouraged
by an increase in offerings, are now
upgrading their music programs by
hiring full -time professionally
trained musicians. Louisiana seems
perennially to be fluctuating be-

tween extremes.
The numerous Protestant denominations in Louisiana are conspicuously conservative. Even those
mainline groups which in the North
provide a compromise between liturgical traditions and pulpit pounding lean here toward a more or less
overt fundamentalism . Their services largely showcase music in the
country-gospel tradition . The vast
wealth of Reformation chorales,
psalms, hymns, and motets is practically untapped and has been replaced by songs of mindless senti-

A remembrance
of things past: John Berryman
slated to speak in the Mayo Auditorium
and almost every summer session student
vowing to be there.
Packed house : Berryman shuffles
past the lectern and stares.
Silence. He wants more of that:
absolute quiet. Absolute thickens
phlegm in dry throats, coughing rattles
the room , notebooks slide, a cigarette
lighter clinks against an arm rest,
breathing is fortissimo ...
Absolute silence
After a long time he does not read his poems.
He talks about Anne Frank. He holds her diary
like a host
speaks of her presence.
Of that evening, I remember
these thoughts: "Anne," he said,
"disciplined herself to get up each morning
as though hope were at the door.
There has not been so witnessing a word
since Augustine's Confessions."
Grace is everywhere.

Sister Maura
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mentality and emotionalism.
The oil industry has brought with
it droves of conservative Protestants
and a corresponding reduction of
South Louisiana's Catholic majority
from a one time high of more than
85 per cent of the population to
somewhere less than half. Protestant
growth is most evident in the enormous Baptist churches of the area,
which are able to mount Broadwaystyled gospel music productions
with a mind-boggling assortment of
electronic technologies. The First
Baptist Church of Lafayette regularly hires a chamber orchestra to
back up its choirs and each year
presents a massive pageant which
it calls a "symphony of song,"
showcasing such guests as Pat or
Debby Boone. In the past it would
have been unthinkable to sink such
huge sums of church resources into
this type of "ministry."
The staggering dimensions of
change in Acadiana may in the end
be the arts greatest ally. Riding the
surge, music can establish itself as
part of the new order while at the
same time providing a sense of stability for those who yearn for the
security of traditions. Last year the
small town of Mansura in Avoyelles
Parish at the northern tip of the
Cajun triangle hired Lafayette musicians to accompany a high mass.
The service was to cap off the local
festival and would be sung by a
small amateur choir from the area.
The music included-in addition
to a Bruckner motet, various chant
formulas, and varied hymn settings
-the Mozart Coronation Mass. It
was an impressive undertaking.
It is inconceivable that most of
those in the pews could actually
have grasped the full magnitude of
Mozart's music, yet there was definitely a sense of satisfaction and
spiritual fulfillment to be felt, a
sense of connection with that continuity of civilization of which we
are all part. It is on this foundation
that the future will be built.
Cl
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Health and Medicine
In the
Lutheran Tradition
By Martin E. Marty. New York:
Crossroads. 178 pp. $14.95.
This book is the second in a series
of volumes edited by Martin Marty
and Kenneth Vaux. The purpose of
the series is to explore the ways in
which major religions relate to the
questions of human well-being. The
introductory volume to the series
was published in 1982 under the
title Health/ Medic£ne and the Faith
Traditions. A third volume, Kenneth
Vaux's Health and Medicine in the
Reformed Tradition, has also been
published. Though a great many
books have been written on the
church's healing ministry and the
relationship between faith and
health, there are no studies of these
themes from within separate faith
traditions. The comprehensiveness
of this series and the excellent reputation of the authors chosen to write
the individual volumes provide the
promise that the series will become
a standard reference work for years
to come.
The choice of Marty to author the
volume on the Lutheran tradition
is an obvious one. Marty is a highly
respected church historian who has
remained a committed Lutheran
churchman throughout his career.
Since he is serving with Kenneth
Vaux as a general editor of the entire series, he was the logical choice
for this assignment even though

the area of exploration was new to
him.
The book is divided into three
parts. Part I, entitled "Wellness and
Illness," is devoted to theoretical
issues. In this section Marty does a
theological analysis of wellness and
illness from a Lutheran point of
view. Part II, "Caring and Curing,"
examines moral issues in modern
medicine, the healing ministry of
the church, and institutions, roles,
and practices of caring. Part III,
on "Passages," covers issues in sexuality, human development, and
dying.
The best chapter in the book is the
first chapter of Part I, in which
Marty juxtaposes two questions,
"Are you saved?" and "How are
you?" The thesis of the first chapter,
and ostensibly of the whole book, is
"that most of what Lutheranism has
to say about well-be£ng, also in the
physical sense, is an analogy to
what the tradition says about being
saved." More specifically, the thesis
is that the gospel of the forgiveness
of sins is the hermeneutical key for
interpreting what the tradition has
to say about well-being in general.
This means, among other things,
that well-being is primarily a gift
rather than a duty and that life organized around the forgiveness of
sins is the form that all of life should
take, including physical, emotional,
and mental life. It means that faith
should be active in well-being, the
well-being of others as well as oneself, because service and obedience
flow out of one's response to the gospel of forgiveness. It means that
well-being can be traced to the process of God's continual action of
bringing order out of chaos. It means
that the gospel assures freedom of
research in natural science without
being locked into a scientific worldview. Though Marty is quick to say
that these themes are not un£que to
Lutheranism, he does make a strong
case for saying that they are dist£nct£ve Lutheran emphases.
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Marty uses his hermeneutic effectively in the remaining two chapters
of Part I in which he offers a Lutheran understanding of mental
illness and suffering. He uses Aarne
Siirala's book on The Voice of Illness
as an example of a Lutheran approach to mental illness and
Luther's theology of the cross as a
way of understanding suffering.
Part I by itself is worth the purchase
of the book, providing a characteristically Lutheran way of thinking
about wellness and illness.
The hermeneutic which Marty
uses so effectively in examining the
meaning of "wellness and illness"
in Part I is not nearly as obvious in
his analysis of the practice of "caring
and curing" in Part II. This is unfortunate since a consistent use of
the hermeneutic would have provided the basis for integrating Part
I (analysis of theory) and Part II
(analysis of practice). Part II is much
less readable than Part I- too many
references to surveys and minor
theologians and not enough interpretation of the broad sweep of
history.
As an interested participant m
the renewal of healing ministry in
the church, I think that Marty's
treatment of the tradition is uneven .

For example, the chapter on healing
is devoted almost exclusively to
charismatic healing with only a passing reference to medical missions.
Lutherans were active participants
in a noble effort in the nineteenth
century to link modern medicine
with the healing mission of the
church. A brief history of that movement along with a comparison and
contrast to the charismatic movement would have resulted in a much
more balanced treatment.
Part III, "Passages," is even weaker in my judgment. In less than fifty
pages Marty attempts to cover complex issues in the broad areas of
sexuality, family life, generativity,
psychosocial development, conception and abortion, faith development, and dying. Not only is the
treatment of these issues done in a
necessarily cursory manner, but it
is not obvious to me why a section
on "passages" should be included
in a book on health and medicine
in the Lutheran tradition. Marty is
not to be faulted for attempting to
do too much in this book. The series
is designed so that the same topics
(ten) will be covered in the analysis
of each of the faith traditions (ten).
The problem is that issues in bioethics are much too complex to be
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treated in the cursory fashion that
they must be in a survey book of
this kind.
In spite of the shortcomings of
this volume, it is a valuable book for
opening the door to a rich heritage
within Lutheranism for understanding health and critically examining
the contributions of modern medicine.

Confirmation and the
Charismata
By Theodore R. Jungkuntz. New
York: University Press of America.

113 pp. $7.75.
The role of confirmation in the
church has been a hotly debated
issue over the past two decades. Is it
a sacrament? What is its relation to
baptism? Is it something that God
does (outpouring of the Holy Spirit)
or is it something that the person
does (make a commitment, join the
church)? Should it be ritualized,
and if so, at what age should the person be when the ritual is performed?
These questions are being asked
within all denominations, and the
answers that are given often cut
across denominational lines .
Such is the case with Confirmation
and the Charismata by Theodore
Jungkuntz, professor of theology at
Valparaiso University. His answers
to the above questions grow out of
his participation in the charismatic
renewal, a renewal that is truly ecumenical. Though Jungkuntz is himself a deeply confessional Lutheran,
it is his involvement in the charismatic renewal that gives this book
its distinctive flavor and qualifies
it as an important contribution to
ecumenical dialogue.
The definition of confirmation is
clearly stated in Chapter One, "ConThe Cresset

firmation in the New Testament."
According to the New Testament,
Jungkuntz says, the "right way" to
understand confirmation is to see it
"as that which God does in response
to a faith which obediently and
prayerfully seeks after God." What
God does is to "strengthen," "seal,"
and "guarantee" the "believer's selfunderstanding as a child of God
and thus equips him or her to carry
out the call to live the Christian life
in a manner which builds up the
church." The charismata (manifestations of the Holy Spirit) are evidence of confirmation, which is a
repeatable event rather than an
isolated, unitary rite. One of the
strengths of this book, and not just
the first chapter, is its appeal to
scriptural authority. Jungkuntz
makes a strong case for his definition
on the basis of that authority.

Jungkuntz suggests that
Luther's famous tower
experience was a
confirmation of his
baptismal experience
not the only one, but a
particularly powerful one.
The next four chapters are historical studies of the development
of the theology and practice of confirmation in the church. These chapters are written by a scholar for
scholars. The amateur theologian
will find them rough sledding. The
history of confirmation is not easy
to trace, partly because what eventually became official church doctrine and practice (confirmation as
a sacrament for seven-year-olds performed by the bishop in which the
Holy Spirit is conveyed in richer
measure on those already baptized)
evolved slowly and along different
paths. Originally part of an initiation ceremony which included bapOctober, 1984

tism and first communion, confirmation gradually became a sacrament
separated from both baptism and
first communion.
As one who has worked with many
of the same sources on another project, I was impressed with Jungkuntz's mastery of the historical
material. To his credit, he presents
this material without distortion or
prejudgment on the basis of his own
interpretation of the meaning and
importance of confirmation. He
provides as clear and concise a review of the history of confirmation
as I have seen anywhere.
The last chapter, "Confirmation
in the Twentieth Century," provides
both an analysis of the current controversy over confirmation and the
author's own proposal for how confirmation should be understood and
practiced today. Jungkuntz begins
by describing the influence of three
renewal movements on the question
of confirmation: the liturgical renewal, the pedagogical renewal,
and the charismatic renewal. Jungkuntz traces the impetus for a reappraisal of the liturgical role of
confirmation to the Vatican II directive that the "intimate connection
which this sacrament (confirmation)
has with the whole of Christian initiation should be more lucidly set
forth." These belong together because "the faithful are born anew by
baptism, strengthened by the sacrament of confirmation, and finally
are sustained by the food of eternal
life in the eucharist." The goal of
those who are informed by these
directives, including Lutherans and
Anglicans, is to restore the ancient
rite of Christian initiation in which
baptism , confirmation, and first
communion are indivisible parts of
a single whole. The pedagogical
renewal puts a heavy emphasis on
confirmation as a sacrament (or rite)
of maturity in which baptismal faith
is confirmed "by (increasingly mature) reaffirmations of that faith."
Jungkuntz refers to my book on Self

Realization and Faith as an example
of how recent studies in faith development can be used to support
both the meaning and practice of
confirmation as a rite which confirms the Christian identity of young
people.
The weakness of both the above
positions is that they say so little
about the manifestations ofthe Spirit
which can be expected by those who
have been baptized. "If we would
allow our faith to be instructed and
expanded by the full range of the
New Testament witness to the Pentecostal gifts of the Holy Spirit, we
could once again more decisively
and more broadly experience 'Confirmation' as it was before it was so
radically reduced to a liturgical
ritual or to a secularized rite of maturation." It is the experiential dimension of confirmation which
Jungkuntz thinks has been lost. As
an example, he suggests that Luther's famous tower experience was
a confirmation of his baptismal rebirth-not the only one, of course,
but a particularly powerful one.
Jungkuntz notes that there has
been little effort within the charismatic renewal to explicate a theology
and practice of confirmation. He
does not claim to speak for the broad
ecumenical community of charismatics, but offers this treatise as a
basis for discussion not only among
charismatics but among all those
who are concerned about the question of where confirmation belongs
in the church today. Towards that
end he offers at the close of the book
a set of discussion theses which are
clearly and cogently stated. I highly
recommend this book to anyone
who is interested in the future of
confirmation in the church. It is valuable both for its historical background as well as the unique contribution it makes from the perspective
of charismatic renewal to the current controversy about confirmation.

c:

Thomas A . Droege
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Of Pets & People
Dot Nuechterlein
Do you consider yourself a friend
of mine? Careful how you answer
that- perhaps you should read this
through first, for I am about to reveal an awful character flaw, a trait
that has the power to separate one
from most of the rest of polite society.
The simple, honest, painful truth
is that I hate animals. Did you get
that? I said, I hate animals! Do you
have any idea how ostracizing such
an admission can be? Perhaps hate
is too strong a word- I do not wish
the creatures any bodily harm . But
I would prefer to live my life without ever having anything to do with
any of them. Even removing them
all (except maybe giraffes) from the
face of the earth would be fine by me.
This is not a popular opinion.
Practically everyone I have ever
run into keeps pets, and many people claim their animals are like
members of the family. They act
like it, too: in fact some adults shower more attention and affection on
their critters than they do on their
children, and that bothers me.
For one thing, the sight of people
(small children and lonely senior
citizens excepted) kissing and slobbering over Fido and Fluffy is revolting. But more importantly, the
message that comes across to some
sons and daughters is that pets are
more important and more valued
than humans. As a high school student I worked for a family with that
attitude , and it has troubled me ever
since.
Most families, I'll admit, don't go
to such extremes; animals share
their lives without dominating them.
We had a few friendly beasts while I
was a child, although none ever
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stayed inside the house, as I recall.
Subsequently all of my three sisters
and two brothers grew up normally
and have lived with dogs and cats
and other assorted non-humans ever
since.
For a long time I thought I was
the only one with this untypical
aversion. Then I met the man of
my dreams. Those who knew us
when we were dating and became
engaged thought our relationship
was doomed to failure; here were
two very different individuals who
seemed to have few joint interests.
Little did they suspect that we had
discovered a great common bond,
and that our eventual marriage
vows included a secret pact: never,
under any circumstances, would we
ever allow ourselves or any of those
in our household to share bed and
board with furs or feathers.
This has sometimes been a struggle to maintain, especially when
small blue eyes pleaded, and once
we gave in to a gift of goldfish (which
blessedly lasted no longer than goldfish ever do). But together we have
stood firm and faced down the rest
of the world.
How, you might ask, can we possibly turn cold heart and icy stare
against darling little puppies and
bunnies and such? Easy. Animals
smell. Of course kids do, too, but
once you get them potty-trained
and positively motivated towards
showers and shampoo the more di~
agreeable aspects of human odor
can be handled. Nothing, however,
seems to be do-able about the kitty
litter under the kitchen table (retch)
and the doggie dirt in the backyard
(barf).
Most pets also shed stuff off of
their bodies. I am not allergic to
hairs and dander, but I sometimes
wish I were-that has become a socially acceptable way to keep animals at a distance. I just find their
leavings on my clothing and belong-

ings to be disagreeable. Now kids
also shed things but can be threatened with serious consequences if
they don't learn to pick them up.
Unfortunately I have an overdeveloped sense of fastidiousness
(invisible as it may be to other eyes)
so that I find it offensive to be licked
or pecked at by some other species.
In addition I am not a hugger by
nature or practice. Oh, indeed I do
hug and kiss people, but almost always those whom I know and care
about. At times I feel assaulted when
just any old body gets "familiar," so
you can see that given my opinion
of animals, being jumped upon and
such brings me to the brink of
apoplexy.
No, give me children any time. Of
course kids don't make perfect companions, either. No soft little fuzzy
thing is likely to snarl at you in response to a simple greeting like
"Good morning," or give away your
treasured magazines to a Boy Scout
paper drive without asking, or turn
up the volume on the car radio to
the zillionth decibel, or become an
utter stranger the moment a school
friend wanders by, and so on. And
only boys and girls and men and
women can break one another's
hearts. But to me that's worth the
gamble.
Some months ago syndicated columnist Mike Royko was heaped with
abuse when he wrote of his scorn for
little bitty dogs (although he likes
big ones, for some unfathomable
reason). I know that's what's in store
for me, too- the old editor's mailbox
will overflow with hate mail and
threats of cancelled subscriptions,
so this bit may be my last.
Why risk it? Simply to encourage
the two or three of you out there
who are fellow misoanimalysts not
to be intimidated; and to let everyone else know that you pet people
may control the world, but you'll
never get our souls.
Cl
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